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I. INTRODUCTION
President Clinton has focused national attention on the problems facing the
American health care system. This attention is long overdue; fundamental
reforms are badly needed. It is not clear, however, that the Clinton
Administration has its priorities completely in order. Much attention is being
paid to questions concerning limits on fees for medical services, the availability
and scope of health insurance coverage, and the allocation of responsibility for
insurance costs. These matters are of great importance, and certainly merit
sustained deliberation. In my opinion, however, there exists a narrower
problem which, because of its great urgency and the relative ease with which it
can be addressed, should be given priority over these larger but more complex
and intractable concerns.
We have in this country what can only be described as a scandalously
ineffective legal and institutional framework governing the transplantation of
human bodily organs. Thousands of Americans die every year for want of a
kidney, a heart, a liver, or a pancreas, while the organs that could prolong their
lives are fed to worms.' It does not have to be this way. Armed with modem
* Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law. J.D., Yale
University, 1985; Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1978; M.S., George Washington
University, 1974; B.S., Michigan State University, 1969. I would like to give my
special thanks to Lloyd Cohen, whose excellent George Washington Law Review paper
on organ futures markets originally inspired this Article and guided its development.
Anyone who reads both Cohen's paper and this Article will recognize that I have
drawn heavily upon his analysis and arguments, and that my Article should be
regarded as an extension of his pathbreaking work. Lloyd has also provided me with
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medical technology, with its sophisticated surgical equipment, procedures, and
arsenal of highly effective immuno-suppressant drugs, our doctors are capable
of carrying out the needed organ harvesting and transplantation surgeries at a
substantial but acceptable cost2 and with excellent survival rates.3 Just as
some very useful research sources, and with helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. I would like to also thank Tom Mayo for his extensive and insightful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article and Julie Lawson for her excellent
research assistance.
11 am indebted to Lloyd Cohen for this gruesome but accurate metaphor. Many
commentators who have contributed to the recent legal and medical literature in this area
have noted that there is a severe and growing shortage of transplantable organs, and that
there exists an adequate but unutilized supply of such organs in the cadavers of those
persons who die of accidental causes and whose organs are suitable for transplantation but
are not made available to potential recipients. See generally James Childress, Ethical
Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for Transplantation, 14 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & LAW 87 (1989); Lloyd Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: 7he
Virtues of a Futures Market 58 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 1 (1989); Henry Hansmann, The
Economics and Ethics of Marketsfor Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & LAw 57
(1989); Howard Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the Supply of
Transplantable Organs: From UAGA to 'Baby Fae,' 10 Am. J.L. & MED. 397 (1985);
Richard Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant
Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & LAw 483 (1986); Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note,
Personalizing Personalty. Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REv. 209
(1990); Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1519 (1990); Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015 (1985).
While there is general agreement that potential recipients are dying while utilizable
organs are being wasted, the commentators disagree sharply on whether allowing the
commercial sale of organs would be an effective and acceptable means of dealing with the
problem. Writers who generally support relaxation of the prohibitions against commercial
transactions in organs include, among others, Cohen, supra; Hansmann, supra; Charles K.
Hawley, Note, Antitrust Problems and Solutions to Meet the Demand for Transplantable
Organs, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1101 (1991); Schwartz, supra; Schwindt & Vining, supra;
Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, supra; Note, Regulating the
Sale of Human Organs, supra; Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MIcH. L. REv.
1182 (1974) [hereinafter The Sale of Body Parts]. Writers who favor retention of these
prohibitions include, among others, RUSsELL ScOrr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981);
Childress, supra; Bray, supra; Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in
Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
Rnv. 628 (1989).
2 A heart transplant operation was estimated in 1986 to cost between $60,000 and
$110,000, and a liver transplant between $70,000 and $240,000. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERv., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION:
IssuEs AND RECOMMEDATIONS 99 (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. A pancreas transplant
was estimated in 1987 to cost between $30,000 and $50,000. M.H. Cooper, Survey of
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importantly, the necessary organs are physically available from cadavers alone
in sufficient quantities to meet existing and projected needs. 4
This unfortunate situation is not a tragedy, strictly speaking, because there
is nothing inevitable about it. These many deaths from organ failure are no
longer the result of an inexorable fate that we must accept, but occur in the
modem world only as the unintended consequence of a flawed legal regime that
can be changed. The existing state and federal laws that govern the
transplantation of organs prohibit the commercial sale of organs by donors to
recipients or brokering intermediaries. 5  We have institutionalized a
transplantation system that relies totally upon donor altruism for its supply of
organs. Not surprisingly, the number of organs supplied falls well short of
meeting the needs, and many potential transplant recipients who could live
productive and satisfying lives instead linger painfully and fruitlessly on long
Development, Current Status, and Future Prospects for Organ Transplantation, in HUMAN
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 18, 22 (1987). The total one-year costs associated with transplant
operations were estimated by another observer to be between $170,000 and $200,000 for
heart transplants and $230,000 and $340,000 for liver transplants. George J. Annas,
Regulating Heart and Liver Transplantation, 25 JURIMERICS J. 249, 250-51 (1985). These
costs are difficult or impossible to estimate with any precision because most transplant
facilities are parts of larger hospital complexes rather than independent facilities, and the
arbitrary nature of the allocations of fixed costs across different areas of operation render
total cost estimates rather meaningless. Cohen, supra note 1, at 35 n.104.
The arguments I offer in this Article are premised upon my belief that the social
benefits of saving lives through organ transplant surgeries justify incurring social costs of
these magnitudes, and that therefore measures that would expand the availability of organs
for transplant, other things being equal, should be pursued. There are, however,
commentators who have taken the position that society currently allocates excessive
resources to heroic medical interventions such as organ transplants, and for that reason
alone might oppose reforms that would enhance organ availability. See, e.g., RENEE Fox &
JuDrrH SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS 208 (1992): "We do believe, however, that all the
professional and public consideration given to transplants ... and the social value
commitments that organ replacement epitomizes are helping to divert attention and human
and financial resources away from more basic and widespread public and individual health
care needs in our society." ld.
Such commentators might support the existing organ sale restrictions primarily on the
basis of the "natural gatekeeper" function those restrictions serve, obviating the need for
society to make these extraordinarily difficult resource allocation decisions in an explicit
manner. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
3 The one-year transplant survival rates, had by'1985 reached the following levels for
various categories of transplants: kidneys 92-95%; hearts 75-85%; livers 60-70%;
pancreases 75-80%; and heart-lung combinations 50%. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 17.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 42-87.
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waiting lists6 and then die of organ failure. 7
Wise legislators design laws to govern people as they are, not as we would
wish them to be. If history teaches us anything it is that we cannot rely solely
upon the altruistic feelings of producers to provide society with the needed
goods and services. We must also harness the powerful motivation of economic
self-interest to ensure that those dangerous, difficult or unpleasant tasks that
need to be done are done.8 While most people sincerely profess to draw some
intrinsic satisfaction from their work, relatively few would continue to labor
with the same dedication and intensity they now exhibit were they not
financially compensated for their efforts.
So it is with organ donations. While most persons are generally inclined to
help their fellow man when the opportunity arises, they are also inclined to
avoid confronting the unpleasant fact of their own mortality. There is a
powerful psychological resistance to turning to look at the angel of death
always perched on one's shoulder; something one cannot really avoid when
seriously contemplating the possibility of posthumously donating one's organs.9
Our unfortunate experience with a donation-based system of organ supply
suggests rather strongly that for most persons the anxiety created by
contemplation of their mortality overcomes their altruistic fellow feeling and
saps them of the resolve to serve as organ donors. Moreover, the next of kin of
a recently deceased person with harvestable bodily organs-usually a victim of
6 The National Kidney Foundation estimated in 1989 that 21,000 people in the U.S.
were on organ transplant waiting lists. National Kidney Foundation, KIDNEY '89, Mar.-
Apr. 1989, at 5. Another group estimated in 1989 that 16,363 persons were awaiting a
kidney, 1,324 persons a heart, 830 persons a liver, 322 persons a pancreas, 240 persons a
heart-lung combination, and 94 persons a lung. UNTrED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING,
TRANSPLANT STATISTICS (1989).
7 Each year an estimated 15,000 people who might benefit from a heart replacement
operation die. Roger W. Evans & 1. Yagi, Social and Medical Considerations Affecting
Selection of Transplant Recipients, in HUMAN ORGAN REPLACEMiENT 27-28 (1987).
8 I can do no better than to quote from the master here:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but
of their advantages.
ADAM SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INro THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 14
(Modem Library ed. 1937).
9 Cohen, supra note 1, at 10-15 (arguing that organ donation requires an individual to
confront his mortality "in the particularly vexing form of an invitation to assent to his own
dismemberment").
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a sudden death caused by traumatic brain injury or cerebral hemorrhage-are
still in a state of shock and grief at the time when the organ donation decision
must be made. Such an emotional state is not conducive to consenting to
uncompensated dismemberment of the recently sentient corpse, and most
medical personnel are understandably highly reluctant to even broach the
subject. Enough organs will be voluntarily supplied to meet the substantial and
rapidly expanding transplantation needs only if and when we allow potential
organ recipients or their agents to augment the noble altruistic feelings of
potential donors or their bereaved kin with the promise of more tangible
compensation.
There are a number of arguments that have been offered in opposition to
the creation of a commercial market in bodily organs. 10 Some of these
arguments are specious, but others have some merit and are grounded in
fundamental and widely shared beliefs concerning the dignity of individuals and
the importance to personhood of bodily integrity." It has been rather
convincingly argued, however, that it is not necessary to impose a blanket
prohibition banning all commercial organ transactions-thereby creating a
severe organ shortage and effectively sentencing thousands of persons a year to
needless suffering and death-to adequately address these concerns. 12 The
critical needs of persons who require organ transplants to survive and the
concerns of defenders of principles of personhood and individual dignity can
both be met through the imposition of a regulatory structure that allows the
commercial sale of organs to take place, but only within the confines of a
"futures" market. 13
A futures market in bodily organs would in all likelihood dramatically
increase their availability for transplantation, saving many lives. Such a market
would be entirely contractual and consensual in its operation, fully respecting
the rights of persons to dispose of their organs as they see fit. It would enable
us to satisfy all transplant organ needs from cadavers alone rather than
requiring the removal of paired organ (such as a kidney) from live donors. The
increased availability of organs would probably relieve society altogether from
the current burden of having to make (and disguise) the "tragic choices" as to
which persons will be denied organs and left to die. 14 Moreover, such a market
10 For elaboration of the arguments offered for and against allowing the creation of a
commercial market in bodily organs see infra notes 88-128 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 88-128 and accompanying text.
12 See generally Cohen, supra note 1; .Hansmann, supra note 1; Schwindt & Vining,
supra note 1.
13 See generally Cohen, supra note 1; Hansmann, supra note 1; Schwindt & Vining,
supra note 1.
14 See generally GuIDo CALABREsI & PHILLIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHoicEs (1978)
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could be designed so that no one would be put into the position where he
would be tempted to sell a bodily organ to meet a pressing financial exigency.
A properly structured futures market would alleviate the dire organ shortage
while avoiding the entire parade of horribles regularly invoked by opponents of
commercialization.
The merits of the futures market approach are becoming more widely
recognized. Even the medical community, which has historically expressed
strong opposition to the introduction of financial incentives into the organ
supply system, 15 is finally beginning to recognize that a futures market would
likely increase organ availability while adequately addressing the concerns of
those who hold reservations about commercialization. For example, the House
of Delegates of the American Medical Association (AMA) recently adopted the
recommendations of a report provided to it by the AMA Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs16 that strongly endorsed the futures market concept, and
that called for the implementation of a pilot futures market program that would
utilize financial incentives to encourage organ donation. 17 The advantages of a
futures market over the current donation-based system of organ supply and
over other alternatives such as a "presumed consent" system18 or a cash
market19 are compelling from almost any reasonable point of view. What is not
nearly so clear is how to get from here to there; how to change the laws that
are now preventing the development of a futures market.
This Article will first review the basic features of the current shortage of
transplantable organs, 20 and will outline the existing legal framework
governing the transfer of those organs. 21 I will then present and discuss the
arguments that have been offered for and against allowing the commercial
transfer of bodily organs.22 I will describe the series of increasingly
sophisticated proposals that have been offered over the past decade for the
creation of a regulated futures market in transplantable organs, and set forth my
(discussing the difficulty society has in dealing candidly with triage decisions).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 115-22.
16 Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future
Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, Report 1-93-6 of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, American Medical Association (1993) (adopted by the AMA House of
Delegates on December 7, 1993) [hereinafter CEJA Report 1-93-6].
17 Id. at 8-9. This significant report is discussed more fully later in this Article.
See infra text accompanying notes 320-23.
18 See infia text accompanying notes 210-18.
19 See infra text accompanying note 219.
2 0 See infra text accompanying notes 27-41.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 42-87.
2 2 See infra text accompanying notes 88-128.
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
own proposal.2 After closely scrutinizing this proposal, I will conclude that
while the concept of a futures market for organs does present certain risks and
shortcomings, a properly designed futures market would be so superior to the
existing social arrangements, and to other possible alternatives, that immediate
and decisive action to create such a market is necessary. 24
In the final substantive Part of this Article, I will argue that the existing
laws governing organ transplantation cannot be reasonably reinterpreted to
allow a futures market to operate.25 I will then propose a two-pronged strategy
for bringing about the needed statutory changes. 26 This strategy combines
constitutional challenges to the validity of the federal and state law restrictions
on organ sales, with efforts to create a politically effective coalition to lobby for
statutory reform at the federal and state levels and block efforts to reimpose
new legislative restrictions should the constitutional challenges prove
successful. It is my hope that this Article will contribute to moving this urgent
question from the pages of the law reviews into the courts and legislatures, and
will speed the day when neither you nor I need fear dying a slow and painful
death of organ failure while suitable organs are being interred to moulder.
H. THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
Several factors have combined over the past few decades to give rise to a
tremendous increase in the need for bodily organs that can be transplanted into
recipients suffering from organ failure. First, and most importantly, there have
been dramatic advances in the technology of organ transplantation. The
refinement of surgical techniques, the invention of sophisticated surgical
support and life-maintenance equipment such as respirators, ventilators, and
dialysis machines, and the development of highly effective immuno-suppressant
drugs have combined to make organ transplantation a common and almost
routine procedure with a high survival rate.27 At least twenty-five different
bodily tissues and fluids have been transplanted in human beings, including key
23 See infra text accompanying notes 129-67.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 168-218.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 219-37.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 238-324.
27 Cohen, supra note 1, at 3. In 1986 alone there were 8,960 kidneys, 1,368 hearts,
924 livers, and 45 heart-lung combinations transplanted in the United States. Robert Pear,
U.S. Will Require Hospitals to Identify Potent.al Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1987,
§ 1, at 26. The one-year transplant patient survival rates had by 1985 reached the following
levels for various categories of transplants: kidneys 92-95%; hearts 75-85%; livers 60-
70%; pancreases 75-80%; and heart-lung combinations 50%. TASKFORCE, supra note 2, at
17.
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internal organs such as kidneys, hearts, livers, and pancreases. 28 Second, a
variety of nutritional and medical factors have interacted to increase average
lifespans, and older persons obviously face higher probabilities of organ
failure.29 Third, it has proven to be difficult to develop adequate artificial
organs that could substitute for transplanted human organs.30
The supply of transplantable organs has unfortunately not kept up with the
tremendous growth in demand. 31 Many people are on long waiting lists for
organs, 32 and the unfulfilled demand represented by those lists probably
significantly understates the number of persons who would benefit from an
organ transplant.33 It has been estimated that at the current level of medical
knowledge and technique there is a backlog of approximately 15,000 persons
who would benefit from a heart transplant, 22,500 persons from a kidney
transplant, 5,000 persons from a liver transplant, and 5,000 persons from a
pancreas transplant.34 Because only a few thousand cadavers suitable for organ
harvesting are donated annually,35 many of these persons will die because of
the lack of timely availability of suitable organs.3 6
While live donors can supply certain body tissues, such as a single kidney,
the tail of the pancreas, and regenerative fluids such as blood and bone
marrow, the basic sources of transplantable organs are the cadavers of people
who have died in a manner that did not damage their transplantable organs and
that allows rapid medical access to those organs after death. The ideal donor
pool consists of the cadavers of those persons who die in hospital settings due
to accidental injuries. This pool is large enough to meet the existing and
28 Cohen, supra note 1, at 3.
29 Schwindt & V'ining, supra note 1, at 484.
30 Id.
31 Hansmann, supra note 1, at 57.
3 2 Cohen, supra note 1, at 4. Between December 1987 and June 1991 the total number
of patients on organ transplant waiting lists increased 75.3% from 13,153 to 23,056
patients. Strategies for Cadaveric Organ Procurement: Mandated Choice, Presumed
Consent, and Financial Incentives, Report 1-93-2 of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, American Medical Association 1 (1993) [hereinafter CEJA Report 1-93-21.
33 Cohen, supra note 1, at 4.
3 4 Cohen, supra note 1, at 4-5.
35 In 1984, for example, less than 3,300 cadavers were donated. TASK FORCE, supra
note 2, at 36. Between 1987 and 1990 the number of organ donors stayed nearly constant,
increasing only from 4,000 to 4,357 donors. CEJA Report 1-93-2, supra note 32, at 1.
36 It was estimated by the United Network for Organ Sharing in September 1991
that at least 8.7% of patients needing a liver transplant die before an organ becomes
available; other estimates place this figure closer to 30%. CEJA Report 1-93-2, supra
note 32, at 1. Over one three-month period in 1991, nearly 500 transplant candidates
died waiting for organs. Id.
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projected near-term needs for transplant organs. Each year, for example,
-approximately 60,000 persons die in automobile accidents alone.37 The Center
for Disease Control estimates that 12,000 to 27,000 of these auto accident
victims die in a hospital. 38 Those victims alone would provide on the order of
24,000 or more kidneys and 12,000 or more of each of the unpaired organs
annually for transplant purposes; quantifies more than sufficient to the meet the
annual growth in the potential recipient population, quickly clear the existing
organ waiting lists, and provide organs for those persons not now on formal
waiting lists but who could benefit from an organ transplant.39 When one
considers also that a number of persons die in hospital settings as a result of
nonautomobile accidents or for other causes that leave their transplantable
organs viable, it is clear that the supply of cadavers is sufficient to meet the
current demand for organs. 40 One commonly quoted estimate of the number of
cadavers usable each year in the U.S. for obtaining transplant organs is
20,000.41 Anything even approaching full utilization of these cadavers could
eliminate the backlog of needed transplant operations within one to two years,
saving many thousands of lives.
The current severe organ shortage therefore does not reflect the physical
unavailability of sufficient transplantable organs. The shortage is instead the
result of a poorly designed legal and institutional framework governing organ
donations that does not adequately utilize the available cadavers. Let me turn to
a brief discussion of those legal and institutional arrangements.
III. THE LAW GOVERNING THE TRANSPLANTATION OF ORGANS
A. U.S. Law Prior to 1968
Prior to the Second World War organ transplantations in the U.S. were
governed in all states by common law principles. The common law generally
did not recognize property rights in cadavers beyond the limited rights
37 Cohen, supra note 1, at 5.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See S. REP. No. 382, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976 (stating that "up to 20,000 people die annually under
circumstances that would make them suitable. organ donors").
41 C.O. Callender, Legal and Etldcal Issues Surrounding Tramplantadon. Te
Transplant Team Perspective, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 46 (1987). The Task
Force on Organ Transplantation has estimated that between 17,000 and 26,000 potential
cadaveric organ donors become available annually. TAsK FoRcE, supra note 2, at 35.
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accorded the decedent's next of kin to arrange for disposal of the corpse, 42 and
was not well-designed to facilitate efficient use of cadaver organs for medical
purposes. There were no recognized procedures by which a cadaver could be
irrevocably donated for medical use. Organ donation clauses contained in wills
were not regarded as final testamentary dispositions of property and could, in
some circumstances, be challenged by the spouse or close relatives of the
decedent. 43 The decedent's next of kin were also hindered by legal uncertainty
concerning the nature and scope of their rights to dispose of the bodily
organs. 44
This legal regime may have been relatively adequate to meet medical needs
during the long era when the demand for cadavers and cadaver organs was
limited to the modest requirements of medical education and research. 45 After
the Second World War, however, there was an increasing need for human
tissues and organs for medical research, education and therapeutic extract
purposes and, eventually, for transplantation. 46 This increasing need for
organs, coupled with some signs of public willingness to donate organs, led
42 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 186-87; Stephen A. Montinger, Comment, Spleen for
Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your
Body, 51 OHIOST. L. 1. 499, 502 n.35 (1990).
43 At common law the right of a decedent to determine the disposition of his remains
was regarded as a personal right rather than a property right. The disposition was therefore
not regarded as part of the probate estate, and the decedent's wishes were not accorded the
legal weight normally accorded to testamentary dispositions. The decedent's wishes would
normally be honored in court, but could be defeated by strong objections from close
relatives or the surviving spouse. See The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1184-85,
1247.
44 The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1185. For further discussion of the
common law of cadaver dispositions and the rights of the next of kin, see generally B. loan
Krauskopf, Comment, 7he Law of Dead Bodies-Impeding Medical Progress, 19 OHIO ST.
L. J. 455 (1958); Jack H. Olender, Note, Donation of Dead Bodies and Parts Thereoffor
Medical Use, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 523 (1960); W.T. Windsor, Jr., Note, The Law of
Testanentary Disposition-A Legal Barrier to Medical Advance!, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 40
(1956).
45 But see SCOTT, supra note 1, at 4-12, in which he discusses in entertaining fashion
how the lack of property rights in cadavers in Britain in the early 19th century gave rise to
the profession of the "body snatcher" to satisfy the needs of medical schools, and ultimately
led to a multiple-murder scandal which inspired passage of the Anatomy Act of 1832. That
legislation allowed for the donation of cadavers for anatomical examination. Id.
46 In 1954 doctors performed the first successful kidney transplant. Notes on Science,
N.Y. Trams, Mar. 7, 1954, § 4, at 9. In 1967 Dr. Christian Barnard made history by
performing the first human heart transplant. Heart Transplant Keeps Man Alive in South
Afica, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1967, § 1, at 1; see also Nancy Stadtman, The First
Transplants, NEWSwEEK, Aug. 29, 1983, at 42-43.
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many state legislatures to enact organ donation statutes. 47 California led the
way in 1947,48 and many other states followed suit during the 1950s and early
1960s. 49 By 1968 the large majority of the states had promulgated anatomical
donation legislation which accorded persons or their surviving kin the right to
donate organs for transplantation or other medical purposes.50 In addition, a
few states permitted limited commerce in human organs,51 although no such
transactions appear to have taken place.52
While these anatomical donation statutes were certainly a major advance
over the common law in terms of establishing and clearly demarcating certain
property rights in bodily organs, and thus facilitating their donation and
transplantation, they suffered from major deficiencies. They were often
inadequately drafted, 53 and the inevitable state-to-state variations in scope and
coverage54 created uncertainty regarding the status of gift authorizations
executed in other states. 55 The growing shortage of transplantable organs that
resulted during the 1960s, when great advances were made in transplantation
technology, focused attention on the shortcomings of this statutory mosaic and
gave impetus to efforts to draft a uniform statute that would increase the
availability of organs. In 1965 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws appointed a subcommittee to draft a model act that would
encourage the donation and use of cadaver organs. 56 Both the National
Conference of Commissioners and the American Bar Association endorsed the
resulting Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)57 in 1968.58 This uniform
47 7w Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1185.
48 Cohen, supra note 1, at 6.
49 The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1185.
50 Id. In addition, during the 1960s a few states adopted statutes explicitly prohibiting
the sale of human bodies and bodily organs. Those states repealed those statutes when they
adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act after 1968. See, e.g., Law of Aug. 1, 1968, ch.
429, § 7, 56 Del. Laws 1773, 1773 (1967) (repealed 1970); Law of Apr. 22, 1964, ch. 702,
§ 1, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1827, 1828 (repealed 1971); Act of June 12, 1967, ch. 353, 1967
Mass. Acts 202, 202 (repealed 1971).
51 For a short time period between the late 1960s and about 1973, Delaware, Hawaii,
Nevada, New York, and Oklahoma did permit contingent sales of organs by decedents, as
well as sales by the next of kin. Cohen, supra note 1, at 7. These statutes were repealed by
these states when they adopted the UAGA. Id.
52 Cohen, supra note 1, at 7.
53 The Sale ofBody Parts, supra note 1, at 1185 n.26.
54 Id. at 1185 n.27.
55 Id. at 1185-86.
56 Id. at 1186.
57 UNtF. ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983).
5 8 Alfred M. Sadler et al., The Unform Anatonical Gift Act: A Model for Reform, 206
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statute was a great success-at least in terms of its enthusiastic legislative
acceptance, if not in achieving its ultimate objective of alleviating the organ
shortage-with almost half the states adopting it in some form within fourteen
months of its promulgation. 59 By 1973, all states and the District of Columbia
had adopted the main provisions of the UAGA. 60 The relevant provisions of
the UAGA will be briefly discussed below.
B. The 1968 Version of the UAGA
The original 1968 version of the UAGA explicitly gives individuals the
right to designate whether their bodily organs are to be donated for
transplantation upon their death.61 Where a decedent has not made his wishes
known, the UAGA gives the next of kin the right to designate whether the
organs are to be donated. 62 The UAGA deals expressly only with the
uncompensated donation of organs; it is silent on the subject of sales or other
commercial transactions.
Given this silence, it is uncertain whether the UAGA should be interpreted
to prohibit commercial transactions in bodily organs. According to the
chairman of the committee that originally drafted the UAGA, it was intended to
neither encourage nor discourage commercial transactions in organs.63 If the
UAGA is interpreted to not cover organ sales, then its universal adoption
would have left in force the prior state statutes prohibiting such transactions, in
the few states in which such statutes existed, 64 and elsewhere would have left
in force the restrictive common law principles to govern compensated cadaver
disposition.
It is unclear how the UAGA was interpreted by the adopting legislatures
with regard to its treatment of organ sales. Several states had adopted pre-
JAMA 2501, 2501 (1968).
59 The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1188.60 Ann McIntosh, Comment, Regulating the 'Gift of L'fe'-The 1987 Uiform
Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WAsH. L. REv. 171 (1990).
61 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr Acr §§ 2(a), 3, 8A U.L.A. 34,41 (1983).
6 2 Id. § 2(b).
63 "It is possible, of course, that abuses may occur if payment should customarily be
demanded; but every payment is not necessarily unethical.... Until the matter of payment
becomes a problem of some dimensions, the matter should be left to the decency of
intelligent human beings." E. Blythe Stason, The Unifonn Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus.
LAW. 919, 927-28 (1968).
64 Six states-Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New York-
included express prohibitions against the sale of organs in their pre-UAGA statutes. The
Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1248 n.446. All of these states repealed these statutes
after adopting the UAGA. Id.
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UAGA statutes during the 1960s that explicitly prohibited the sale of organs,
and those states repealed those statutes when they adopted the UAGA.65 It is
difficult to draw a clear conclusion concerning the intentions that underlie the
adoption of the UAGA from these subsequent legislative actions. These repeals
may have been the result of programs of repealing all relevant statutes
predating the UAGA, regardless of their nature, and therefore would shed no
light on how the UAGA was interpreted by the adopting legislatures.
Alternatively, those repeals may have reflected a judgment that the UAGA was
a permissive statute that over-rode the prior prohibitions on sales, rendering
them invalid. 66 As a third alternative, those repeals may have been based upon
a judgment that the UAGA implicitly incorporated those prohibitions, making
the earlier statutes redundant. 67 Despite the lack of clear evidence of legislative
intent, however, the state codifications of the UAGA have subsequently been
widely interpreted as making organ sales illegal at least to the extent of
rendering unenforceable contracts for the sale of organs. 68
The somewhat uncertain legal status of organ sales under the UAGA was
largely mooted in 1984 when Congress adopted the National Organ Transplant
Act (NOTA)69 to govern interstate commerce in bodily organs. The relevant
provisions of NOTA will be discussed briefly below.
C. NOTA and Subsequent Federal Legislation
NOTA represents a major extension of federal power into an area
traditionally reserved for state law. NOTA has several major features. First, it
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide significant
financial assistance to local organ procurement agencies. 70 Second, it
established the 25-member Task Force on Organ Transplantation (Task Force)
to inquire further into the policy issues raised by organ transplants and make
recommendations to the Secretary.71 Third, it created the National Organ
65 77w Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1248 n.446.
66 The Delaware legislature, at least, may have had this belief, since they added a
prohibition against organ sales to their version of the UAGA. The Sale of Body Parts, supra
note 1, at 1248 n.446.
67 This is the position favored in The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1. See also
SCOTT, supra note 1, at 190 ("Most of these [pre-existing state law restrictions on organ
sales].. .were abolished when the states successively adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, since the act was believed to exclude all sales.").
68 Cohen, supra note 1, at 7.
69 National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274(e)(1988)).
70 42 U.S.C. § 273(a) (1988).
71 42 U.S.C. § 273 (1988).
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Procurement and Transplantation Network as a vehicle for matching organ
donors with those who need transplants. 72 Most significantly, NOTA makes it
a federal crime "for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce." 73 The punishment
provided for violation of this prohibition is a fine of up to $50,000, or up to
five years in prison, or both.74
The legislative history of NOTA reveals little if any careful policy analysis
justifying the very broad prohibition of organ sales.75 Congress appears to have
assumed without reflection that allowing any form of compensation to be paid
to organ donors would violate fundamental social norms. There was no attempt
made to examine alternative regulatory frameworks that might harness financial
incentives to enhance organ availability without transgressing those norms. In
particular, there was no effort made to distinguish between the effects of
allowing a cash market in organs to exist and the quite distinct effects of
allowing compensation to be paid for organs only through a carefully designed
futures market framework. Moreover, when the Task Force submitted its first
major report in 1986, it summarily reaffirmed NOTA's blanket prohibition of
the commercialization of organ transplantation, offering only the conclusory
observation that "society's moral values militate against regarding the body as a
commodity," and suggesting that a ban on organ sales is appropriate to
"encourage altruism." 76 The Task Force report also encouraged individual
states to adopt their own prohibitions on the commercial sale of organs because
of concern that NOTA, being limited to interstate commerce, might not be
wholly effective in suppressing all such sales. 77
The federal government has taken one further step after NOTA to
encourage organ donation. Pursuant to a provision contained in the 1986
72 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2) (1988).
73 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (1988). This prohibition does not govern blood transfusions, nor
extend to reasonable payments made solely to cover the costs incurred in transplanting an
organ. Id.
74 Id.
75 The Senate Report on NOTA merely stated: "It is the sense of the Committee that
individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale of human organs for
transplantation," and "human body parts should not be viewed as commodities." S. REP.
No. 382, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982. The
House Conference Report stated only that NOTA "intends to make the buying and selling of
human organs unlawful...." H. CONF. REP. No. 1127, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992.
76 TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 96.
77 Hansmann, supra note 1, at 59. This recommendation was followed by the drafters
of the 1987 revision of the UAGA. See infra text accompanying notes 81-86.
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 78 hospitals may not participate in the
Medicare or Medicaid programs unless they establish "written protocols for the
identification of potential organ donors ... ."79 These protocols must set forth
procedures by which families of potential donors are informed of their option
to donate organs.80
D. The 1987 Version of the UAGA
Even after the passage of NOTA the shortage of organs for transplantation
continued to become more severe. In response, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a new version of the UAGA in
1987.81 The 1987 version incorporates a number of new provisions designed to
facilitate the donation of organs.82 It also, however, incorporates an express
provision prohibiting the sale of organs for removal after the death of the
donor.8 3 Unlike the 1968 version, the 1987 version of the UAGA has
78 Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9318(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2009 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-8 (1988)).
79 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)o)(A) (1988).
80 Id. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A)Q).
81 UNIP. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT, 8A U.L.A. 3 (Supp. 1993). "It has become apparent
that [the promulgation of the 1968 UAGAI is not producing a sufficient supply of organs to
meet the current or projected demand." Id. at 4 (quoting with approval from HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN
PROCUREMENT (Oct. 1985).
82 The 1987 version of the UAGA prohibits the sale of organs that are to be removed
after the death of the donor (though it does not purport to govern the sale of organs that are
to be removed prior to death), reduces the formalities involved in executing donative
documents, prioritizes donor consent over family objections, allows medical examiners to
release usable organs for transplantation, and requires hospital personnel to routinely ask
patients about their willingness to become organ donors. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT
§§ 2-5, 10, 8A U.L.A. 12-22, 29-30 (Supp. 1993).
83 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACr § 10, 8A U.L.A. 29 (Supp. 1993). The Comment to
Section 10 of the 1987 UAGA refers to the 1986 Task Force on Organ Transplantation
report that recommends that states pass laws prohibiting the sale of organs, and cites the
following statements from a Hastings Center report:
Altruism and a desire to benefit other members of the community are important moral
reasons which motivate many to donate. Any perception on the part of the public that
transplantation unfairly benefits those outside the community who are wealthy enough
to afford transplantation, or that it is undertaken primarily with an eye toward profit




encountered significant opposition, with debate centering on both the
authorization and consent provisions and the routine inquiry requirement. 84 As
of April, 1993, only fourteen states had adopted the 1987 version,85 with the
remaining states and the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands
retaining their existing statutes that were based upon the 1968 version of the
UAGA. 86
E. Swnmary of Edsting Law
The existing body of law governing organ transplantation is thus relatively
straightforward and can be briefly summarized. Both federal and state law
allow and encourage the donation of bodily organs for transplantation as
uncompensated gifts. While the 1968 version of the UAGA-in force in most
states-does not expressly prohibit the commercial sale of organs, it is
generally interpreted to do so, at least to the extent of rendering contracts for
sale unenforceable. Both NOTA and the state laws based upon the 1987
version of the UAGA clearly prohibit the commercial sale of bodily organs.
While arguments can be offered that the facially restrictive language of NOTA
can reasonably be reinterpreted to allow at least a futures market-if not a cash
market-in bodily organs to operate, those arguments are unconvincing.8 7 It is
clear that significant changes in both federal and state law will be required if a
futures market in bodily organs is to be established.
IV. SHOULD ORGAN SAiLs BE ALLOWED?
The organ commercialization controversy has now gone on for almost
three decades, 88 with remarkably little progress having been made towards
Id. at 30. Unlike NOTA, the 19,87 version of the UAGA does not address the sale of organs
to be removed prior to the death of the donor.
84 See Ann McIntosh, supra note 60.
85 UNRI. ANATOMICAL GIrr Acr, 8A U.L.A. 3 (Supp. 1993).
86 Id. at 33. Several states that have retained their statutes based upon the 1968 UAGA
have, however, added provisions restricting the sale of organs that are similar to those
provisions contained in the 1987 UAGA. Bray, supra note 1, at n.103.
87 See infra text accompanying notes 219-37.
88 While the first kidney transplant took place in 1954, see supra note 46, the issue of
the commercialization of bodily tissues did not receive widespread public attention until the
publication in 1968 and 1971 of two British works that took sharply opposing stances with
regard to the question of allowing blood sales in England. See M.H. COOPER & AJ.
CUYLER, THE PRICE op BLOOD (1968) (concluding that allowing payments to be made to
blood donors would increase supplies and reduce costs); RICHARD TrrMuss, THE GiFr
RELATIONSHI (1971) (opposing blood sales). Titmnss responded to the arguments for
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reaching a resolution that would satisfy the key concerns of both proponents
and opponents of commercialization. Organ transplantation policy seems to be
an area where the "debate," if one can so characterize the exchanges of
accusations and lofty moralisms, reflects more the jousting of fundamentally
opposed ideological stances than a shared commitment to reach a consensual
solution. 89
Proponents of commercialization are often professional economists who
allowing blood sales with vehement and comprehensive criticisms that foreshadowed many
of the arguments later asserted by opponents of organ sales:
From our study of the private market in blood in the United States we have concluded
that the commercialization of blood and donor relationships represses the expression of
altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers scientific standards, limits both
personal and professional freedom, sanctions the making of profits in hospitals and
clinical laboratories, legalizes hostility between doctor and patient, subjects critical areas
of medicine to the laws of the marketplace, places immense social costs on those least
able to bear them-the poor, the sick and the inept-increases the danger of unethical
behavior in various sectors of medical science and practice, and results in situations in
which proportionately more and more blood is supplied by the poor, the unskilled, the
unemployed, Negroes and other low income groups and categories of exploited human
populations of high blood yielders. Redistribution in terms of blood and blood products
from the poor to the rich appears to be one of the dominant effects of the American
blood banking system.
Moreover, on four testable non-ethical criteria the commercialized blood market is
bad. In terms of economic efficiency it is highly wasteful of blood; shortages, chronic
and acute, characterize the demand and supply position and make illusory the concept
of equilibrium. It is administratively inefficient and results in more bureaucratization
and much greater administrative, accounting and computer overheads. In terms of price
per unit of blood to the patient [it is more expensive].... And, finally, in terms of
quality, commercial markets are much more likely to distribute contaninated
blood ....
Id. at 245-46.
89 James Blumstein, Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 1.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAw 5 (1989). Blumstein argues that "widely disparate
ideologies.., have developed in the area of organ transplantation," and that federal organ
transplantation policy "reflects intense hostility to pluralism, decentralized decisionmaking,
profit-making, commercialization, competition, private choice, and even private
property .... " The organ transplantation enterprise "has indulged in an excess of
romanticism, mandating altruism and communitarianism at the expense of saving lives." Id.
at 36. He contrasts this attitude with the fact that "[In] other facets of health policy, the
emerging consensus has been to require advocates for deviations from competitive norms
and decentralized pluralism to bear a burden of justification-and to narrowly tailor
proposed deviations to cure specific, delimited market failures." Id.
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have been trained (and, perhaps, are also naturally so inclined) to accord great
importance to the promotion of efficient resource allocation. 90 They
consequently are disposed to favor market outcomes over the usually less
efficient results of non-price allocation mechanisms. 91 They view the organ
shortage as a near-textbook illustration of how the imposition of a price ceiling
upon the equilibrating processes of supply and demand92 weakens supplier
incentives and causes persistent excess demand. From their perspective, a free
market is a highly efficient means of moving goods from lower- to higher-
valued uses, and the suspension of the price mechanism greatly hinders the
transfer of harvestable organs from cadavers to persons who would benefit
immensely from transplantation of those organs. They repeatedly call attention
to the fact that we do not expect suppliers of other goods and services-
including medical goods and services-to act purely out of altruistic motives,
and regard the organ sale prohibitions as anomalies in a society committed to
concepts of private property and voluntary exchange. 93 They criticize the
existing donation-based organ supply system of having an increasingly Rube
Goldbergesque air about it, as policymakers attempt desperately to alleviate the
organ shortage in a noncoercive manner while avoiding resort to the one
measure that has any prospects for success-allowing potential transplant
recipients or their agents to offer financial incentives to potential organ
donors.94
An additional argument sometimes offered in favor of allowing
commercialization of organ transactions is that this would not only expand
organ supplies, but would also lead to a more efficient distribution of the
available organs among potential transplant recipients by facilitating a shift
from a local to a national system of allocation. 95 Under the current donation-
based system, rights to most harvested organs are now governed by a "rule of
90 For example, Lloyd Cohen holds a Ph.D. degree in economics from the State
University of New York, Binghamton; Henry Hansmann holds a Ph.D. degree in
Economics from Yale University; and Richard Schwindt and Aidan Vining are both
professional economists on the faculty of Simon Fraser University in Canada.
91 See generally Cohen, supra note 1; Hansmann, supra note 1; Schwindt & Vining,
supra note 1.
92 The prohibition of organ sales, in conjunction with the allowance of organ
donations, is logically equivalent to requiring all organ transactions to take place at or below
a zero "price."
93 Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Lmv, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1624 (1990).
94 Cohen, supra note 1, at 23-24 (discussing the convoluted nature and unintended
consequences of proposals to require doctors to request the relatives of a newly deceased
person to donate his organs).
95 Hansmann, supra note 1, at 82-83.
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capture" under which the organs effectively become the property of the hospital
that harvests them and the local organ procurement agency.96 Because these
institutions are not permitted to sell these organs, the only way they can benefit
from their possession is to transplant them themselves and thus create
additional professional opportunities for the physicians and other health care
professionals associated with these institutions. 97 This fact creates a perverse
incentive for hoarding organs for local use rather than sharing them with
transplant centers elsewhere that may have more pressing needs. 98 A market
for organ sales would more closely align incentives with needs, and would
facilitate a national allocation of organs to the highest-valued uses.
Opponents of commercialization have at times attempted to counter directly
these economics-oriented claims by arguing that allowing commercialization
will not significantly increase the supply of transplantable organs of suitable
quality. Those arguments, however, overlook the most elementary economic
principles and are strained and unconvincing. For example, it is often argued
that allowing organ sales would reduce the number of organs donated, and thus
have little or no effect upon the total supply of organs. 99 While this result may
be a theoretical possibility, it seems highly unlikely to occur. I concede that if
all of those persons who would sell their organs if market opportunities were
available would donate those organs for transplantation if sale is prohibited,
then obviously there would be no increase in organ supply due to the existence
of market opportunities. Moreover, if some persons who would have donated
their organs under the current system react adversely to the allowance of organ
sales by refusing to either sell or donate their organs, then organ supplies may
even be reduced by the existence of a market option. 1°° In practice, however,
one would expect that virtually all persons who would currently donate their
organs would either continue to donate or would sell their organs under a
96 Id.
97 Id. at 83.
98 Id.; see also Delay Sought in Combining of Transplant Waiting Lists, DALLAS
MORN. NEWS, June 30, 1993, at 23A.
99 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1984); Cohen, A
Futures Market in Cadaveric Organs: Would it Work?, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEDURES
60 (1993).
100 This possibility is suggested by the prior experience with the legalization of blood
sales. When the states first permitted the sale of blood-albeit at very low prices compared
to what one would expect major bodily organs to bring in a free market-the overall blood
supply dropped sharply because the decrease.in voluntary donations-for whatever reason it
occurred-was larger than the increase in paid donations. Procurement and Allocation of
Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings on H.R. 5580 before the Subcomn. on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 361-64 (1983) (testimony of Arthur L. Caplan).
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regime permitting sales. In addition, there certainly must be at least some
persons who are currently unwilling to donate their organs, but could be
induced to supply them by sufficiently strong market incentives. If these
assumptions are valid, as seems likely, then organ supplies will be increased
under a market regime.
A second, related economic argument often made against allowing organ
sales is that a market system would lead to a degradation in the quality of
organs provided for transplantation. The claim is that the persons who do not
now choose to donate their organs but who would respond to financial
incentives to sell those organs would, on average, have organs of lower quality
than those now donated. I am not aware of any empirical evidence that supports
this proposition. Even if it were the case, the new supply of harvested organs
that are brought forth by these financial incentives could be quickly and
inexpensively screened for quality, just as donated organs and both donated and
purchased blood supplies are now screened. 10 1
For the most part, however, those persons opposed to organ sales have
declined to engage in meaningful debate concerning the probable organ supply
consequences of various commercialization alternatives-no doubt recognizing
that they will fare poorly in the debate if discussion is conducted according to
the other side's ground rules and evaluative criteria-and instead have
emphasized a number of arguments against commercialization that are based
upon the categorical premise that organ sales are morally wrong, without
regard to whether allowing a market to function would increase organ
availability.' 02 Opponents of organ sales often describe the practice as
"trafficking in human flesh"1 03 or in similar strong metaphors which evoke the
widely felt repugnance with which we regard the concept of one person owning
another. That repugnance is obviously rooted in our long and unhappy
historical experience with slave markets. Any measures which are regarded as
steps in the direction of reestablishing slavery will meet with near-universal
outrage and opposition. If one regards organ sales as somehow analogous to the
slave trade, it is not surprising or improper that one would conclude that organ
sales are degrading to both the buyer and the seller, and to society as a whole,
and are an unacceptable affront to basic principles of personhood and individual
dignity.' 04
101 Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Lav, supra note 1, at
1625.
102 Id. at 1624 ("The principal objeption to paying for organs is philosopiical:
allowing commercialism to displace altruism would be morally intolerable.").
103 Cohen, supra note 1, at 24.
104 For detailed explications of this point of view, see Margaret J. Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. Rnv. 1849 (1987); Bray, supra note 1.
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Allowing organ sales necessarily places a monetary valuation on parts of
the human body. To some commentators, this is a major step towards
subjecting persons to the depersonalizing influence of market rhetoric, and
constitutes a "commodification" of an object that should be held sacred and
above market bartering. 10 5 The human body and its constituent organs are
argued to be literally "priceless" and incommensurable with the normal articles
of commerce. From this perspective, society should not allow the sale of bodily
organs any more than it should allow persons to sell themselves into slavery or
to enslave others. While the willingness to donate an organ is regarded as a
high expression of altruism and communitarian sentiment, anyone who wishes
to sell a bodily organ is either desperate, foolish, or both; a humane and
progressive society that respects human personhood and dignity should protect
such persons from making a serious mistake that they are likely to deeply
regret. 106
Opponents of commercialization often argue that your bodily organs are
simply not your property to sell; that while you have a custodial and possessory
right to use those organs during your lifetime, you do not have a full-fledged
alienable property right with regard to objects that are inextricably connected to
your personhood. 10 7 Just as a parent may exercise custody and control over his
children, but may not regard them as his property and sell them, you do not
105 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 1, at 241 ("An individual's integrity is affected
negatively by being discussed in market rhetoric as a fungible commodity, because such
terminology ignores the unique qualities and differences between individuals."). This
position has also been well stated by Margaret J. Radin:
One way to see how universal market rhetoric does violence to our conception of
human flourishing is to consider its view of personhood. In our understanding of
personhood we are committed to an ideal of individual uniqueness that does not cohere
with the idea that each person's attributes are fungible, that they have a monetary
equivalent, and that they can be traded off against those of other people. Universal
market rhetoric transforms our world of concrete persons, whose uniqueness and
individuality is expressed in specific personal attributes, into a world of disembodied,
fungible attribute-less entities possessing a wealth of alienable, severable "objects." This
rhetoric reduces the conception of a person to an abstract, fungible unit with no
individuating characteristics.
Radin, supra note 104, at 1885; see also TrTMuss, supra note 88, at 245-46; William F.
May, Religious Justfications for Donating Body Pa;ts, 15 HAST. CENTER REP. 38 (1985);
M.W. Wartofsky, On Doing It for Money, in BIoMEDIcAL ETHICS 186 (Thomas A. Mappes
& Jane S. Zembaty, eds. 1981).
106 See generally Radin, supra note 104.
107 Id. at 1891-98.
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have a property right to sell your organs. This argument is offered even more
forcefully against allowing a decedent's next of kin to sell his organs.' 0 8 When
presented with arguments that allowing organ sales only under a futures market
regime that is subject to appropriately designed restrictions will prevent much
suffering and loss of life while adequately protecting personhood and dignity
concerns, opponents of commercialization respond at times with a variant of
the classic "slippery slope" argument: that once organ sales are permitted as a
matter of principle, the moral high ground will be lost and it will be difficult or
impossible to withstand market forces that seek to promote increasing
commercialization of the body and further erosion of the inherent rights of
personhood.' 09
Finally, opponents of commercialization argue that allowing a market in
organs to exist would reveal as starkly as possible the immorality of allocating
needed goods and services on a willingness-to-pay basis in a society such as
ours that is characterized by a highly skewed distribution of wealth. They
regard it as morally unacceptable to permit rich people to purchase kidneys
from poor persons who are forced by their economic difficulties to sell their
own flesh, while other poor persons that need transplants but cannot afford
them are left to suffer and die.10 They point, for example, to our adoption of
laws that no longer permit military draftees to purchase substitutes, and argue
that organ sale restrictions demonstrate the same spirit of regarding basic rights
and responsibilities as more important than personal wealth.,
So articulated, the issues are rarely joined in productive fashion.
Proponents of commercialization often fail to take the "commodification/rights
of personhood" arguments of their opponents entirely seriously, seeing no
meaningful parallels between their carefully framed proposals and the
acknowledged historic evils of the slave trade, and instead search for vested
interests that benefit from the current donation-based organ supply system and
that may be "behind" the emotional and moralistic anti-commercialization
arguments." 2 There are in fact some identifiable groups who appear to benefit
108 Cohen, supra note 1, at 26.
109 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 104, at 1912-14 (discussing the merits of the "domino
theory" under which allowing commodification of certain aspects of life will lead to market
rhetoric dominating all forms of human interaction).
110 This argument is summarized by Cohen, supra note 1, at 26. See also Organ
Transplants: Hearings Before the Subconmm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Conym. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 338-39 (1983) (testimony of
Robert M. Veatch); Marvin Brains, Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their Sale Be
Authofized by State Statutes?, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 183 (1977).
111 Cohen, supra note 1, at 26.
112 This skeptical attitude is illustrated by Lloyd Cohen, who in his article advocating a
futures market for bodily organs writes: "There are many public policy questions on which
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from the existing organ shortage, and who may for that reason, at least in part,
be lending support to efforts to maintain the existing regime. It has been
suggested, for example, that health insurers obtain financial benefits from the
shortage of transplantable organs because it limits the number of expensive
transplant surgeries they must finance. 113 However, any extra burden on
insurers resulting from an increased organ supply would only be transitional,
because insurance companies would adjust their coverage, premiums, and
reimbursement schedules to reflect the increasing number of transplant
surgeries as quickly as possible. 114
The three transplant surgeons' medical associations-the American Society
of Transplant Surgeons, the American Society of Transplant Physicians, and
the International Transplantation Society-have each adopted a resolution
calling for the expulsion of any member who participates in a commercial
organ market.115 A facially plausible special interest explanation of their
support for restraints on commercialization is that while surgeons may
generally be hurt by those restraints because it eliminates certain of their
professional opportunities, current transplant surgeons that are now able to
obtain regular access to organs for transplantation benefit from the existing
system because of the reduced cost of those (donated) organs. While the
number of surgeons who might engage in transplant surgeries were there no
organ-availability limitations is substantially larger than the small number of
current transplant surgeons, those potential transplant surgeons are not aware of
their identity and the magnitude of their financial losses and consequently are
an unorganized group that is not able to effectively counter the political efforts
the law is opposed to the social interest. In most of these cases one can point to an
entrenched and politically potent interest that is well served by the current law." Cohen,
supra note 1, at 24. He concludes, however, that the "ultimate source of opposition" to
organ sales is "public repugnance to the notion of trafficking in human flesh" rather than
special interest lobbying, and that any special interest appeals are parasitic upon those public
attitudes. Id.
Henry Hansmann, however, makes an effort to respond directly to the
"commodification" thesis, and analyzes the sources of that point of view in terms of human
tendencies to reflexively characterize human interactions as either "market" or
"nonmarket" transactions, each with their own appropriate governing norms, and to not
adjust those categories rapidly enough to keep up with changes in technology. Hansmann,
supra note 1, at 74-78.
113 Margaret A. Somerville, "Procurenent vs. Donation"--Access to Twues and
Organs for Transplantation: Should "Contracting Out" Legislation be Adopted?, 17
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 53, 56 (Supp. IV 1985).
114 Cohen, supra note 1, at 24 n.82.
115 Id.
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of the organized current transplant surgeons. 116
In my opinion, however, it is not necessary to resort to special interest
explanations to understand the long-standing opposition of transplant surgeons
to the introduction of financial incentives into the organ supply system. That
opposition can be adequately explained as based upon sincere reservations
about the ethical implications of allowing an unrestricted cash market to
operate, and about the effects of such a market on organ quality and donor
health. For example, Dr. Oscar Salvatierra, President of the American Society
of Transplant Surgeons, testified at some length during the Congressional
hearings that gave rise to the NOTA about the concerns of his organization's
membership. 117 He specifically identified "four major problem areas that
prompt our opposition to the commercial sale of human organs":" 8 (1) the fear
that the poor would become the sources of organs for the rich;' 9 (2) the fear
that the new organs supplied would be of inferior quality and pose health risks
to recipients; 120 (3) the fear that allowing commercial sales would undermine
altruism; 121 and (4) the ethical problems associated with removing organs from
live donors. 122 Each of these legitimate concerns has been previously discussed
in this Article, and I believe that the futures market proposal that I will later set
forth in this Article adequately addresses each of them.
It has also been suggested that government policy makers seeking to limit
budget expenditures benefit from the "natural gatekeeper" function served by
the current donation-based system of organ supply, and would consequently
resist moving to a more market-oriented system likely to sharply increase the
availability of organs for transplant.' 2 3 The argument here is that organ
transplant surgeries are so expensive that in some cases their benefits are
exceeded by their costs. This creates a need for limiting in some fashion the
number of such operations. It has become increasingly difficult for government
institutions to explicitly acknowledge that they will not expend resources when
to do so would save lives. Public perception that the true barrier to organ
116 But see CEJA Report 1-93-6, supra note 16, which reflects the growing
recognition that the broad group of surgeons generally would benefit from increased
organ availability.
117 Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs: Hearings on H.R. 5580 Before
the Subcomm. on Investigation- and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and
Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 268-83 (1983) (testimony of Oscar Salvatierra,
M.D., President of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons).
118 Id. at 269, 275.
119 Id. at 269, 275-76.
120 Id. at 269-70, 276-78.
121 Id. at 270, 278-79.
122 Id. at 270-71, 280.
123 See generally Cohen, supra note 1, at 36-39; Hansmann, supra note 1, at 78-79.
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transplantation was unwillingness to expend resources rather than physical
limitations would create strong political pressures for increased public
spending. 124 On the other hand, if the public can be convinced that the organ
shortage that sharply limits the number of organ transplantations is a "natural"
phenomenon beyond social control, then it may find this limitation politically
acceptable. 125 Therefore government officials may conclude that the current
donation-based system provides a convenient way to avoid facing the difficult,
divisive, and expensive problems of allocation that would exist if organ
supplies were sufficient to carry out all desired transplantations, and might
support the continuation of this approach for that reason without candidly
acknowledging their rationale.
This special interest argument rests on some dubious premises. First of all,
with regard to kidneys-which represent 75% of all transplant operations-
long-term dialysis is a more costly treatment approach than transplantation. 126
Second, if the number of heart, lung, liver and pancreas operations was sharply
increased, average costs would probably fall as tissue matches were improved
by the larger donor pool, learning took place for more fully utilized transplant
teams, and fixed costs were spread over more patients. Consequently, the
increased social costs of the expanded number of operations might not be all
that large.127 Finally, the use of an artificially-contrived organ shortage as a
means for limiting the number of operations is inefficient-since it prevents
many persons who would be willing to pay the full costs of transplantations
from obtaining organs-and is such an unseemly and invidious strategy for
dealing with the allocation question that it is hard to imagine that policy makers
124 Cohen, supra note 1, at 36-37.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 37 n.109. It must be recognized, however, that dialysis costs for a kidney
patient are spread rather evenly over a substantial period of time, while the costs of a
transplant surgery and the attendant postoperative recovery are much more concentrated up
front during the surgery and the first following year. The proper compaisons are between
present values which take into account this difference in timing and consequently do not
overstate the relative advantages of transplant surgery. Nevertheless, transplantation of
kidneys appears to result in savings. In 1978 Stange and Sumner estimated that over a 10-
year period, providing kidney transplants to 1,000 patients who would otherwise be on
dialysis would result in an aggregate cost saving of between $279 million and $300 million;
approximately $300,000 per patient. Paul V. Stange & Andrew T. Sumner, Predict'ng
Treatment Costs and Life Expectancy for End-Stage Renal Disease, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED.
372, 375 (1978). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has more recently
estimated that kidney transplants result in overall savings, compared to the costs of dialysis,
of $62,000 per patient. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECrIONs, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., THE Accnss OF FOREIGN NATIONALS TO U.S. CADAVER ORGANS 10 (1986).
127 Cohen, supra note 1, at 38.
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who did not have more principled objections to organ sales would oppose them
on that basis alone.
Even on those relatively infrequent occasions when the proponents of
commercialization attempt to respond directly to the moral questions raised by
their opponents-and in the rights discourse favored by that latter group rather
than the quantitative, reductionist language of economics-the issues are still
not squarely joined. Proponents of commercialization, when they speak of
rights and responsibilities, tend to emphasize libertarian autonomy principles,
asserting the rights of persons to dispose of their bodily organ property as they
see fit, and call attention to the moral demands arising from the realization that
the organ sale prohibitions are directly responsible for a great deal of suffering
and death. 128 It would be helpful for them to take a more compromising stance
and devote greater efforts to tailoring a proposed framework for organ sale
transactions that would adequately maintain the supply incentives they regard as
so precious while addressing squarely the central personhood and dignity
concerns of those who are leery of allowing further commodification of human
relationships. Serious thinking along these lines, I will later argue, leads one
inexorably towards the compromise solution of an organ futures market,
accompanied by sidebar restrictions on cash sales and by subsidy mechanisms
for making organs available to impecunious recipients.
On the other side of the controversy, opponents of commercialization tend
to take refuge in moral pieties and absolutes stated in very general and abstract
terms, draw inapposite and unfair parallels between organ sale proposals and
past historical atrocities, and fail to give sufficient weight to the moral
imperative to take immediate and effective action to stop the needless suffering
and death of thousands of victims of organ failure each year. They also fail to
concede the brute fact that human behavior is much more responsive to
prospects for financial gain than it is to appeals to altruism. Rather than
offering exhortations that persons should show more concern for the plight of
their fellow man, and interposing blanket objections to all efforts to encourage
desirable behavior through compensation incentives, the defenders of
personhood and dignity need to be more discerning in identifying which classes
of organ transactions would violate core moral principles and which
128 See, e.g., Clifton Perry, Human Organs and the Open Market, 91 ETMcS 63, 67
(1980) Cillustrating that an ethicist argues that any system that alleviates human suffering and
death is acceptable, regardless of the underlying motivations of its participants); Note,
Con~pulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69. COLum. L. REv. 693, 705 (1969) ("[A] death
resulting from the unavailability of an organ is neither inevitable nor must it be viewed
simply as a statistical occurrence. It must be seen for what it is in fact: a senseless tragedy
which could be avoided by overcoming needlessly restrictive taboos."); Developments in the
Law-Medical Technology and the Law, sipra note 1, at 1624.
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transactions could perhaps be tolerated as a necessary concession to human
motives of self-interest if thousands of lives were thereby saved. Such a
realistic stance, I will argue, would also lead opponents of commercialization
towards the middle ground of an organ futures market, accompanied by
restrictions on cash market transactions and subsidies or reliance upon non-
price allocation criteria for the ultimate distribution decisions.
In the next Part of this Article, I will set forth the general characteristics of
an organ futures market, discuss the various proposals that have been set forth
for the establishment of such a market, set forth my own futures market
proposal, and assess the extent to which my proposal addresses the concerns of
both proponents and opponents of commercialization.
V. THE FuTUREs MARKET SOLUTION TO THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
A. General Features of a Futures Market in Bodily Organs
The defining characteristic of a futures market for bodily organs is that
transactions would take the form of a contractual commitment entered into by
the person in whose body the organs are located (the "organ bearer") to make
those organs available to the other contracting party (the "organ buyer") for
transplantation or other purposes upon the death of the organ bearer. If organ
sales are permitted to take place only if they conform to this pattern, the sale of
a decedent's organs by his surviving kin would be prohibited, as would the sale
by an organ bearer of a paired organ to be removed while the bearer is still
alive. The organ buyer under a futures contract would be under no obligation
to harvest those organs upon the bearer's death or otherwise dispose of the
cadaver, but would merely have an option right to harvest those organs should
he choose to do so.
The concept of a futures market in bodily organs raises many questions; as
usual the devil is in the details. There are a large number of choices that will
have to be made in giving structure to such a market. The following list
provides a summary of the more important areas where governing rules of one
sort or another would have to be imposed. 129 I have listed these areas in
roughly descending order of significance, although all of them would have to
be addressed by any serious proposal.
129 A number of other issues of somewhat lesser significance would also have to be
addressed by a comprehensive futures market proposal, including the extent to which
international participation will be permitted.
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1. Timing of Payments to Organ Bearers or Their Designees
Probably the most crucial question concerning the operation of an organ
futures market is whether organ buyers will be permitted to make current cash
payments to organ bearers or their designees in exchange for obtaining future
rights to organs, or whether instead payments will only be permitted to be
made to the deceased organ bearer's estate or designees when the bearer dies or
when the organs are harvested by the buyer.
2. Size of Payments to Organ Bearers or Their Designees
It would have to be determined whether the prices paid to organ bearers for
entering into futures contracts would be left to be set by competitive forces, or
whether there would be regulatory restrictions (such as price ceilings) imposed
upon the contracting process.
3. Class ofAllowable Designees
It would have to be decided whether organ bearers would be allowed to
freely assign their contingent rights to future payments. Alternatively, those
rights could be made wholly nonassignable-remaining estate property-or
restricted in assignability to, say, close relatives and charitable organizations.
Allowing assignment to creditors of the organ bearer could conceivably lead to
creditor pressure on debtors to enter into organ futures contracts when they
might prefer iot to. If this creditor coercion problem is regarded as serious, it
may be advisable to go even further and exempt organ sale proceeds paid to
organ bearer estates altogether from claims asserted by estate creditors.
4. Contracts Involving Minors
Futures market contracts entered into by minors would be unenforceable
against their estates under general contract law principles. i30 Small-size organs
harvested from minors, however, are the best and sometimes the only suitable
organs for certain categories of recipients, such as other young minors, and
often promote higher recipient survival rates for other classes of recipients as
well. 131 It must be decided whether the availability of small-size organs should
13 0 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 228-33 (2d ed. 1990).
131 The survival rate of kidney transplant recipients is significantly higher if the donor
organ comes from a 6-to-15 year-old donor than from a 56-to-70 year-old donor. U.S.
KIDNEY FACr BOOK 21 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare Pub. No. (NIH) 73-335)
(1972).
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be enhanced by allowing the parents or guardians of minors to commit their
charges to contracts for the future delivery of their organs-as part of a "family
contract" or otherwise-subject to the right of those minors to rescind their
commitments upon reaching majority.
5. Bailee Responsibilities
It would have to be established what responsibilities will be imposed upon
the hospital or other facility in which the organ bearer dies for notifying the
organ buyer and for preserving the organs in harvestable condition until they
can be removed, and what financial compensation these facilities would be
entitled to for carrying out these services. The question of compensation for
good faith but unsuccessful efforts to maintain organs in harvestable condition
also needs to be addressed.
6. Organ Buyer Eligibility
It would be necessary to establish criteria specifying who can legally
contract to be an organ buyer. The market could be structured so that a single
governmental agency would be the sole buyer, or so that a single private entity
would operate as a regulated monopsony buyer, or so that a number of private
or public entities or both would be allowed to compete in some fashion to
obtain futures contract commitments. It would also have to be decided to what
extent a secondary resale market in future organ rights would be allowed to
operate, and who could participate in that market.
7. Allocation of Organs Among Potential Recipients
It would have to be determined how the available organs, once harvested,
would be allocated among competing claims asserted by potential transplant
recipients. Potential allocation criteria are almost limitless, and could include
willingness to pay, severity of need, clinical prospects for transplant success,
age, first-come first-served queuing, lotteries, or other "faimess"-oriented
mechanisms. The mechanisms chosen for making these difficult decisions
would explicitly or implicitly establish the criteria which would determine the
prices charged transplant recipients by organ buyers.
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The above listed issues frame the more significant dimensions of an organ
futures market which any serious proposal would have to address. In the next
Part of this Article I will review the several comprehensive proposals that have
been made for establishing a futures market in bodily organs, and discuss how
each of those proposals resolves the major questions identified above. I will
then outline a proposal of my own that attempts to incorporate the most
attractive features of the earlier proposals, and avoid their shortcomings, and I
will assess the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal in light of the
arguments previously presented for and against allowing the commercialization
of organ transactions.
B. Prior Proposals for Establishing a Futures Market
In recent years three serious proposals for the establishment of an organ
futures market have been presented in the academic literature: (1) a 1986
proposal by Richard Schwindt and Aidan R. Vining of Simon Fraser
University; 132 (2) a 1989 proposal by Henry Hansmann of the Yale Law
School; 133 and (3) a 1989 proposal by Lloyd Cohen of the Chicago-Kent
College of Law. 134 In the decade prior to the Schwindt and Vining proposal
several advocates for the commercialization of organ transplantation had
offered suggestions that incorporated certain aspects of a futures market, 135 but
none of these early commentators attempted to set forth and defend a
comprehensive futures market proposal.
1. The Schwindt & Vining Proposal
Under the Schwindt & Vining futures market proposal an organ bearer
would receive compensation at the time he contracted with an organ buyer. 136
13 2 Schwindt & Vining, supra note 1.
133 Hansmann, supra note 1.
134 Cohen, supra note 1.
135 See, e.g., Brans, supra note 110; Juliana S. Moore, Comment, The Gift of Life:
New Laws, Old Dilemmas, and the Future of Organ Procurement, 21 AKRON L. REv. 443
(1988) (discussing the proposal by Dr. H. Barry Jacobs to establish a brokerage service for
human kidneys); The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1216-20 (suggesting as a possible
organ sale alternative a contract for future delivery of organs; remuneration to be paid to
the organ bearer's estate or beneficiary after his death); Ellen Goodman, Life for Sale,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 1, 1983, at A15.
136 Schwindt & Vining, supra note 1, at 489. The authors of this proposal discuss
several different ways in which compensation may be paid to the organ bearer: cash
payment; payment to a charity of the bearer's choice; medical insurance discounts;
preferential access to organ transplants if needed; or credit for college tuition, vocational
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The buyer would obtain the right to harvest the bearer's organs if the bearer
should die under circumstances under which the organs were transplantable. 137
The contract, once entered into, would be of lifetime duration unless rescinded
by mutual consent. 138 Schwindt and Vining propose that the government would
be the sole entity entitled to act as an organ buyer and seller to transplant
recipients, 139 and would pay prices established with regard to its inventory
requirements so as to equilibrate supply and demand through supply
adjustments. 140 They attempt to justify this statist and monopolistic aspect of
their proposal by arguing that a governmental monopoly would be necessary to
achieve the economies of scale obtainable in what they regard to be a natural
monopoly situation, and would facilitate the enforcement of organ supply
contracts. 141 The prices charged transplant recipients would not bear any
necessary relationship to the price paid to organ bearers, although the authors
favor basing these recipient charges in most instances upon supply prices plus a
normal load factor. 142
Schwindt and Vining recognize the dilemma posed by the question of
whether to allow minors to commit themselves to future delivery of their
organs. 143 Their solution to this problem is to allow the guardians of minors to
enter them into futures contracts, with the proceeds paid into a trust fund. If,
upon reaching majority, the minor chose to opt out of the organ futures
contract, he could do so and claim some prorated portion of the trust fund
proceeds as compensation for his period of exposure to the risk of having his
organs harvested had he died in a suitable manner. If the minor chose to remain
in the futures contract relationship after achieving majority he could then claim
the entire proceeds of the trust account. 144
This proposal did not address the issue of what responsibilities will be
imposed upon hospitals or other facilities that take possession of organ bearer
cadavers to notify organ buyers and preserve the organs, nor what
compensation those entities will be entitled to for performing those services.
training, or postmortem expenses. Id. at 495-96.
137 Id. at 489.
138 Id. at 496-97.
139 Id. at 489.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 489-90.
142 Id. at 489.
143 Id. at 496.
144 Id.
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2. The Hansmann Proposal
The Hansmann proposal shares some features with the earlier Schwindt &
Vining proposal, but is more comprehensive and differs in several significant
ways. Hansmann also proposes a current payment system under which organ
bearers would receive immediate financial benefits upon entering into a futures
contract under which the organ buyer would have the right to harvest the
organs after the bearer's death. 145 In his proposal, however, the organ buyers
would primarily be large health insurance companies who have natural
advantages in engaging in actuarially-based medical transactions on a large
scale and who would compensate organ bearers by giving them specified
insurance premium reductions during the period in which the (periodically
renewable) health insurance/organ futures contract was in force. 146 Each organ
buyer would submit to a central registry the identification of each person with
whom it had entered into an organ futures contract. 147 Hospitals would be
legally required to consult this registry upon the death of any patient whose
organs were potentially harvestable, and to notify the organ buyer and preserve
those organs in a harvestable state for a reasonable period of time. 148 The
ultimate recipient of any organ would be obligated to pay the organ buyer or its
assignee the latter's stated price upon accepting the organ for transplantation. 149
Hansmann would permit resale of futures contract rights in a secondary market,
so as to take advantage of specialization among risk bearers.1 50
If a person died without entering into an organ futures contract, under this
proposal his survivors would not have the right to sell thoge organs, 151 unless
they had been given that right by the organ bearer by devise and such
dispositions of organ sale rights are legally recognized. Hansmann disfavors
allowing the survivors to sell a decedent's organs as possibly working an
inducement to suicide for some individuals. 152 The prices paid to organ bearers
for future delivery commitments would be set by competitive forces. 153 The
prices charged transplant recipients by organ buyers could be either
administratively or competitively determined, whichever seemed preferable.15 4
145 Hansmann, supra note 1, at 62-63.
146 Id. at 63.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 63-64.
149 Id. at 64.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 65.
15 2 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 66-67.
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3. The Cohen Proposal
The Cohen futures market proposal differs crucially from the earlier
Schwindt & Vining and Hansmann proposals in that compensation would be
paid to the organ bearer's estate or other designee only if and when the organs
are harvested from the organ bearer's cadaver.1 55 Like Hansmann, Cohen is
willing to allow either market or administrative determination of futures
contract prices; he does not believe that there would likely be much difference
in outcome between the two regimes.156 He ventures a "ballpark estimate" that
the price that would be paid for harvested organs would be in the neighborhood
of $5,000 for each major organ such as a heart, liver, or kidney, and
"substantially lesser" amounts would be paid for other transplantable tissue
such as blood, pituitary glands, skin, bone marrow, and corneas. 157 If these
estimates are accurate, then an organ bearer whose organs are all harvested
could have as much as $30,000 or more paid to his estate under this
proposal. 158
Cohen recommends that in order to create the proper incentives for hospital
personnel to notify organ buyers and preserve organs in harvestable condition
until those buyers can make transplantation arrangements, a cause of action in
negligence be established on behalf of the organ bearer's estate and the organ
buyer. 159 The hospital would be liable for the value of any resulting loss
should it fail to exercise reasonable care in its notification and organ
preservation efforts. 160
Cohen favors allowing parents to commit their children to organ futures
contracts, so long as they exhibit a willingness to commit their own organs on
the same terms. 161 He would, however, void any futures contract commitment
involving a minor if the minor died as a result of parental abuse. 162 The
government would in that case take custody of the cadaver and sell the organs
for its own fiscal use. 163 He does not take a dogmatic stance on the question of
whether a secondary market should be allowed to exist, or with regard to
various other procedural/regulatory rules, as long as they are "consistent with
155 Cohen, supra note 1, at 2.
156 Id. at 35.
157 Id.
15 8 Id.
159 Id. at 34.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 41-42.
162 Id. at 42.
163 Id.
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the overriding goal of increasing the supply of organs." 164 He also shows great
flexibility with regard to the question of how to allocate scarce organs among
competing potential recipients, and takes the optimistic view that a functioning
futures market will so dramatically increase organ availability that the need to
make controversial triage choices among competing claimants may well be
mooted altogether. 165
C. The Crespi Proposal
Each of the above proposals has its strengths, but each appears to create
some difficulties or leave crucial issues unaddressed. I here propose for the
sake of discussion a structure for a futures market in bodily organs which
incorporates what I regard as the most desirable aspects of each of the above
proposals. Under my proposal:
1. Organ bearers may enter into futures contracts with organ buyers under
which the buyer will have the option to harvest the organs of the organ
bearer after the bearer's death.
2. Those futures contracts may provide only for payments to be made to
the organ bearer's estate, and only when the organ bearer dies or when the
organs are harvested.
3. All organ futures contracts may be unilaterally terminated by the organ
bearer at any time without liability. Once the organ bearer has died,
however, the contract is no longer terminable by the representatives of the
organ bearer.
4. All proceeds paid to an organ bearer's estate under an organ futures
contract shall be exempt from the claims of any creditor of the organ
bearer or his estate, and shall receive the same tax treatment as would life
insurance proceeds paid to that estate.
5. Any legally competent person may enter into an organ futures contract,
either as an organ bearer or an organ buyer. The organ buyer rights under
such contracts shall be freely assignable. Organ bearer contingent rights to
payment, however, are wholly nonassignable and must remain with the
organ bearer's estate until that estate distributes its assets.
6. The prices to be paid to the estates of organ bearers for their futures
contract participation or for various organs under organ futures contracts
shall be left for determination by market forces.
7. Parents or guardians of minors shall "have the power to commit their
charges to organ futures contracts. Upon reaching majority, any minor may
164 Id. at 43.
165 Id. at 43-44.
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elect to terminate the organ futures contract without liability.
8. If a person dies in a manner that leaves his organs in harvestable
condition, but has not entered into an organ futures contract, his surviving
next of kin may sell the organs for immediate compensation, but the sale
proceeds may be paid only to a church or other nonprofit organization
which will bear no legal obligation to any person as a result of such
payments.
9. No person may sell an organ to be removed while that person is still
alive.
10. The federal government shall establish and fund a national registry of
organ futures contracts, indexed both by organ-bearer identification and
organ-buyer identification.
11. All hospitals or other medical facilities that have custody of a cadaver
shall be obligated to immediately consult the national organ futures contract
registry, and if the registry reveals that an organ futures contract exists
involving the deceased person the hospital shall make reasonable efforts to
contact the organ buyer and request further instructions. 166 The hospital
will have the responsibility to take reasonable measures to preserve the
cadaver's organs in harvestable condition, at its own expense, subject to
reimbursement by the organ buyer if it accepts the organs, until the organ
buyer has been notified. 167 Once the organ buyer has been notified of the
organ bearer's demise, the hospital will remain responsible for taking
166 One would expect that if hospitals were legally required to notify organ buyers of
the death of an organ bearer in their custody, they would as a matter of routine practice
check the organ futures contract registry at the time of admission of a patient rather than
waiting until they became custodians of a cadaver. This precaution would likely result in
minimal delay between the death of an organ bearer and notification of the organ buyer.
167 This would require at a minimum that hospitals utilize mechanical ventilators or
other heart-lung machines to maintain the viability of the organs of a deceased organ bearer
until the organ buyer is notified and gives instructions as to how to proceed. It is more
debatable whether the hospital should be required to take the further step of actually
harvesting organs and preserving them cyrogenically, should this prove necessary to
maintain their viability while awaiting instructions from the organ buyer. On the one hand,
such harvesting would preserve some organs that might otherwise lose viability due to a
delay in communications. On the other hand, this requirement would impose substantial,
nonrecoverable costs upon the hospital should the organ buyer decide that the value of the
organs is less than the contingent payment obligation of the buyer to the organ bearer's
estate, and consequently decline to take the organs. I admit to having some reservations
about imposing any financial obligations upon hospitals that they will not have this right to
recover from organ buyers. It may well be more equitable to create a small federal fund to
reimburse hospitals for prenotification organ procurement expenses in instances where the
buyer ultimately declines to accept the organs.
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reasonable measures to preserve the organs, unless directed otherwise by
the organ buyer, and shall make its facilities and personnel available to
harvest the organs. All costs incurred after notification has been given shall
be the responsibility of the organ buyer, as well as the prenotification costs
should the buyer accept the organs. If the organ buyer declines to harvest
the organs, the hospital's responsibilities shall be terminated. The hospital
will be responsible for preserving the organs of a cadaver in its custody
when the deceased person has not entered into an organ futures contract
only if the hospital is given actual notice that the deceased person's next of
kin wish to have the organs preserved and is given evidence of their
financial responsibility for the hospital's organ preservation costs.
12. Organ buyers may sell harvested organs to transplant recipients or their
agents on any mutually acceptable terms.
In the next Part of this Article the above proposal will be evaluated with
regard to the arguments for and against allowing the commercial sale of bodily
organs.
D. Assessment of the Crespi Proposal
1. Payment/Contract Termination Provisions
My proposal incorporates the essence of the Cohen proposal deferred
payment feature that limits the compensation that can be provided to organ
bearers under organ futures contracts to payments made to their estates or
designees after their death. I have further limited these payments so that they
can only be made to the bearer's estate, are nonassignable, are exempt from
estate creditor claims, and are entitled to the favorable income tax treatment
currently accorded life insurance proceeds. I have rejected the Schwndt &
Vining and Hansmann proposal approaches of allowing organ buyers to pay
current compensation to organ bearers or their designees at the time of
contracting.
This feature of my proposal is an attempt to frame a workable compromise
between proponents and opponents of commercialization in an especially
delicate area. I expect that most potential organ bearers will regard the prospect
of sufficiently substantial contingent payments being made to their estates to be
an adequate incentive to enter into organ futures contracts. Proponents of
commercialization should therefore not strefiuously object to such payment
restrictions. Limitation of payments to organ bearer estates also should address
adequately the core concern of opponents of commercialization: that persons
not be put into a position where they will feel pressured to allow future
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harvesting of their organs to obtain the funds to meet an immediate financial
exigency. The nonassignability and exemption from estate creditor claim status
of those payment rights will remove the spectre of possible creditor coercion of
financially pressed persons into unwanted organ supply contracts. The
favorable tax treatment will help encourage potential organ bearers to regard
organ futures contracts as simply being contingent life insurance contracts,
which is an accurate characterization of their nature, and one that will help
make these arrangements more routine and socially acceptable. The ban on
payments made before the organ bearer's death, coupled with the organ
bearer's right to unilaterally terminate the futures contract without liability at
any time, should allay the fears of those opponents of commercialization who
take a paternalistic stance with regard to protecting persons from entering into
commitments that they will later come to regret but will be unable to undo
because they cannot afford the cost of a "buyout."
One can only speculate as to how the financial terms of organ futures
contracts will evolve under a market regime. My proposal leaves organ buyers
able to offer organ bearers either of two alternative payment options for their
futures contract commitments: (1) a specified contingent payment to be made to
the organ bearer's estate for each type of organ that may be harvested, if and
when that organ is harvested; or (2) a specified payment that is to be made to
the organ bearer's estate upon his death, whether or not any organs are
harvested. Under the first payment option, an organ bearer will have
substantial funds paid to his estate if he dies in a manner that leaves his organs
in harvestable condition and if the buyer chooses to harvest them. In other
words, in return for the organ bearer entering into the organ futures contract
his estate will receive at his death something akin to a lottery ticket; a low
probability of a large payment. Under the second payment option, the organ
buyer would agree to make payment to the organ bearer's estate upon the
bearer's death regardless of whether the organs were harvested. Organ buyers
also could offer as an alternative payment option some combination of options
One and Two above. I would leave it to market forces to determine whether
one of these two payment options will prove to be universally more popular
and crowd the others out, or whether they will coexist as available alternative
contracting terms.168
168 Lloyd Cohen considered the possibility that organ futures contracts might involve
fixed payments to an organ bearer's estate upon his death, whether or not his organs are
harvested. Cohen, supra note 1, at 33. He rejected that payment option as impraciical,
compared to payments made only upon harvesting of the organs, because of the greater
number of financial transactions required, the difficulties involved in determining
appropriate payment differentials between different risk classes of organ bearers, and the
incentive it would create for relatives of decedents with harvestable organs to attempt to
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I would like to examine briefly the incentive structure that each of these
payment options would create for potential organ bearers. This examination
will consider the implications that offering adequate financial incentives to
organ bearers to ensure their large-scale participation in futures contracts would
have for the prices that would have to be charged to recipients of transplant
organs. Such an analysis is necessarily speculative at this point in time and can
only be conducted in general, hypothetical terms. Nevertheless, the results are
quite illuminating and suggest that an adequate supply of organs for
transplantation might be made available at relatively reasonable prices.
Consider the incentives the first payment option-the promise of a large
payment to an organ bearer's estate contingent upon the organs being harvested
at his death-would provide for a hypothetical thirty-five year-old person of
normal health to enter into such a futures contract. Such a person's future
prospects for receiving payment can be specified as a continuous two-variable
probability distribution characterized by: (1) a given probability that his death
will occur at any particular future point in time, and (2) a given conditional
probability that his organs will be harvestable at that point in time, given his
death. These two probabilities can be combined multiplicatively to yield a
distribution of the probabilities of earning the contingent payment at any
particular point in time. 169 While certain generalizations can be made
concerning common features of these probability distributions for different
individuals,' 70 their precise shapes still will vary widely between persons
depending on a large number of demographic and other variables. Persons'
attitudes toward risk also will vary widely; consequently, the valuation in
present value terms that they will assign to the uncertain prospects of payments
to be made to their estates will also vary. As a result, each person will have
their own particular valuation of the contingent prospects of their estate
void the contracts and sell the organs for a much greater sum. Id. at 33-34. While Cohen is
probably correct in his assessment of the relative transaction costs involved in the different
payment options, I would prefer to leave it to market forces to determine what contracting
terms are selected as efficient.
169 The probability of a person earning the payment at any point in time would be the
probability of him dying at that point in time multiplied by the probability that his organs
are harvestable and harvested, at that point in time.
170 For example, a typical 35 year-old person faces first a gradually increasing
probability of dying during any given period of time as he ages, followed by a gradually
decreasing probability in his later ages (you don't have much chance of dying at age 95,
because you are not very likely to live that long in the first place!). A second valid
generalization is that the younger a person is when he dies, the more likely it is that his
organs will be harvestable, because the proportion of deaths that occur due to traumatic
brain injuries or accidents rather than age-related or infectious diseases that make organs
unsuitable for transplants is obviously much greater for younger persons.
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receiving upon their death a given sum.
For the purpose of making some illustrative but informative calculations, I
would like to make some reasonable and simplifying assumptions that abstract
from many of these complexities. Let us consider the situation that faces a
thirty-five year-old person of normal health. Such a person has an additional
life expectancy of about thirty-nine years. 171 Let us assume for now that such a
person expects to die in exactly thirty-nine years. Each year approximately
three million Americans die, 172 and as noted above, approximately twenty
thousand of these deaths are of a kind that leave the organs suitable for
harvesting. 173 In other words, a person has only about a 1/150 chance of dying
in a manner that leaves his organs suitable for harvesting. 174 Let us also
assume that our hypothetical thirty-five year-old person expects that the
probability of his organs being suitable for harvesting after his death exactly
reflects this overall average. Assume also for now that the Cohen price
estimates are accurate: that organ buyers will be willing to pay organ bearers
about $5,000 for each major organ; about $30,000 total (at existing price
levels) to harvest a full set of transplantable organs. 175 Under these simplifying
assumptions, the potential organ bearer is looking at a 1/150 chance of
"winning" $30,000, with the "lottery drawing" expected to take place in thirty-
nine years. If one assumes further that this hypothetical person is risk-neutral
with regard to calculating the present value equivalent of such payment
prospects, 176 regards the prospect of payments made to his estate as fully
171 CHARLES GIVENS, FINANCIAL SELF-DEFENSE: HOW TO WIN THE FIGHT FOR
FNANCIAL FREEDOM 94 (1990).
172 The total U.S. population in 1993 was approximately 258 million persons.
CouNciL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 305 (1994).
This population has an approximate average life expectancy of 75.5 years; 72 years
for men, and 79 years for women. COuNcIL OF ECONOMIc ADVISERS, ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 120 (1993). One would therefore expect that about 3.42
million Americans (258 million/75.5) would die every year. Due to consistent
population growth, however, and due to the demographic consequences of the post
World War 1 "baby boom," the age distribution of the population is currently skewed
somewhat towards over-representation of the younger age groups, and annual death
rates are consequently likely to be closer to three million than to the figure calculated
above.
173 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
174 20,000/3,000,000 = 1/150.
175 Cohen, supra note 1, at 35.
176 A risk-neutral person is defined as a person who regards the receipt of the
unknown outcome of a gamble and receipt of the expected value of the gamble's possible
outcomes as equivalent. A. MIrrcHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCrION TO LAW AND
EcoNoMIcs 28-29 (2d ed. 1989).
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equivalent to the prospect of comparable payments made to him, 177 and
discounts future receipts at a 4% real annual discount rate,178 an organ futures
contract with a contingent $30,000 payment provision will have a present value
to the organ bearer of only approximately $43.29.179
Under the second payment option, the organ buyer would agree to pay the
organ bearer's estate upon the bearer's death regardless of whether the organs
were harvestable. In effect, the organ buyer rather than the organ bearer would
assume the risk of the 149/150 chance that the organs would not be
harvestable. Using the same simplifying assumptions as above regarding risk-
neutrality and rates of time-preference, the organ buyer would then calculate
that he could offer a $200 payment to be made to the hypothetical thirty-five
year-old organ bearer's estate at the time of his death in exchange for the
futures contract commitment,180 an obligation also having a present value of
177 This is a strong assumption. Many persons regard future payments to their estates
as less valuable to them in present value terms than similarly timed payments of equal size
made to themselves. Their preferences might also take into account, however, the interests
of their estate beneficiaries. The existence of a large life insurance industry suggests that
many persons obtain substantial value from the prospects of future payments to their estates.
178 This assumption implies that such a person would regard receipt of a sum of
money today, and the receipt of a larger sum a year from now having 1.04 times the
purchasing power of the initial sum, once adjusted for intervening price level changes, as
equivalent benefits. The use of a 4% real discount rate seems roughly congruent with the
real rate of return usually available on riskless long-term assets such as U.S. Government
bonds. If one utilizes a higher discount rate, the resulting present value will be reduced, and
vice versa. -
179 This is determined by first calculating the expected value of a 1/150 chance at
receiving $30,000 as being $200 (11150 x $30,000 = $200), and then discounting an
expected payment of $200 that will occur in 39 years back to the present at a 4% annual
discount rate to obtain a present value of $43.29 ($200 /(1.04)39 = $43.29).
If one assumes that organ bearers are risk-averse rather than risk-neutral with regard to
such low-probability gambles, this would reduce the expected value equivalent of the
gamble to those bearers, and thus lead them to assign it a present value of less than $43.29.
If their real rates of time preference are greater than 4%, this also would lead them to
assign a present value lower than $43.29 to the payment rights. On the other hand, if their
real rates of time preference are less than 4%, this would lead them to assign a present
value larger than $43.29 to the payment rights. The present value calculation done here is
relatively insensitive ('m absolute if not in relative terms) to the discount rate chosen; use of
a 6% annual rate, for example, yields a present value of $20.62, while use of a low 2%
annual rate still yields a present value of only. $92.38.
180 Out of every 150 organ futures contracts entered into, on average, the organ buyer
could expect to obtain at some point in time one complete set of harvestable organs valued
at $30,000. This would enable the buyer to pay as much as $200 to each organ bearer's
estate at the time of death and still recoup his costs.
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$43.29 to the hypothetical organ bearer.'18
Under my proposal it would be left for market resolution whether organ
bearers would prefer having their estates receive upon their death a small,
certain payment, or instead a long-shot chance at receiving a much larger sum,
or some combination of both options. Of course, if organ buyer payment
obligations are structured as small, certain payments, this has the social
advantage of providing less inducement to a person to attempt to commit
suicide in a manner that preserves his organs so as. to provide a large sum for
his beneficiaries. As Cohen has argued, however-perhaps with tongue-in-
cheek-if persons are inclined to commit suicide it is socially advantageous to
give them incentives to do so in such a way that others may benefit from their
demise!' 82 He also argues, in a more serious vein, that the transaction costs for
organ buyers will be greater under the certain payment option primarily
because such terms will necessitate a much larger number of financial
transactions. 183
Each of the two payment options, both of which have a present value of
only $43.29 to the hypothetical thirty-five year-old organ bearer-$200 with
certainty after an expected thirty-nine year wait, or a long-shot chance at
$30,000 after an expected thirty-nine years-seem to be inadequate to induce
organ bearers to enter into futures market contracts on the needed large scale.
Moreover, these figures make no allowance for the transaction costs for organ
buyers of negotiating futures contracts with organ bearers and subsequently
maintaining adequate records and rapid harvest opportunity response
capabilities. These transaction costs also must be covered out of the proceeds of
organ sales to ultimate transplant recipients, if the organ buyer business is to be
financially viable. One would think that such costs probably would approach, if
not exceed, $43.29 per contract obtained even if the contracting process were
to proceed on a large-scale, standardized basis. If so, and if ultimate organ
transplant recipients were in fact willing to pay only about $5,000 per major
organ, there would be little or nothing left after transaction costs for organ
buyers to pay organ bearers to induce them to enter into the futures contracts.
I believe these illustrative calculations demonstrate that Cohen has seriously
underestimated how high the prices charged to ultimate recipients for organs
will have to be to both cover organ buyer transaction costs and provide organ
bearers with adequate incentives to overcome their reluctance to reflect upon
their mortality and consent to their postmortem dismemberment.184 I suggest,
181 $200/(1.04)39 = $43.29.
182 Cohen, supra note 1, at 40.
183 Id. at 33-34.
184 Lloyd Cohen, after reviewing an earlier draft of this Article, remains of the
opinion that a relatively small financial incentive will be sufficient to induce large-
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for the sake of argument, that it may be necessary to offer prospective organ
bearers a payment option with a present value in the neighborhood of $200 to
assure widespread participation in futures contracts. 185 For the hypothetical
thirty-five year-old discussed above, this would require either a certain payment
of about $924 to his estate upon his death, 186 or a contingent payment to his
estate, if his organs are harvested, of about $138,600 for the entire set of
organs (about $23,100 for each of the five major transplantable organs, plus
another $23,100 for the remaining transplantable.tissue). 187 Either of these
payment alternatives would establish a floor of about $23,100 on the individual
organ sale prices that would have to be charged recipients. I also venture an
estimate of $50 per futures contract for the transaction cost to organ buyers of
negotiating contracts and maintaining records and rapid response capabilities.
This latter figure would result in an aggregate transaction cost of about $7,500
per entire set of organs harvested (about $1,500 per major organ), with this
cost incurred largely at the time of contracting. 188 The future value of this
scale participation in futures contracts, and that the necessary transaction costs might
be quite low. Letter from Lloyd Cohen to the author (January 20, 1994) (on file with
the author).
185 This figure is, I concede, little more than a guess as to the minimum amount
necessary to induce widespread organ bearer participation in futures contracts. One who
disagrees with this estimate can repeat my subsequent calculations utilizing his own
estimate, and the resulting organ sale price estimates will bear almost the same
proportionate relationship to the original estimate of the size of. the needed financial
inducement as do my organ sale price estimates to my $200 inducement assumption. The
changes in the-sale price estimate will not be exactly proportionate to the changes in the
financial inducement, because my method also includes an allowance for the transaction
costs of entering into futures contracts. For example, if one believes that it will require
payment arrangements having a present value of $400 rather than $200 to induce
widespread participation, using my method one will conclude that organs will have to be
sold to recipients at prices in the neighborhood of $53,000 apiece, somewhat less than twice
my estimated $30,000 figure.
186 When discounted back to the present at a 4% annual rate for the expected 39 year
wait, $924 is the amount that yields a present value of approximately $200.
187 When adjusted for the 1/150 chance of receipt and discounted back to the present
at a 4% annual rate for the 39 year expected wait, $138,600 is the amount that yields a
present value of approximately $200.
188 These figures are calculated on the assumption that an average of 150 organ
futures contracts, each at a $50 transaction cost, will be required to obtain one full set of
organs which includes the five major transplantable °rgans (heart, liver, pancreas, and two
kidneys) as well as some additional transplantable tissue worth on the aggregate as much as
a single major organ. I have also assumed that the transaction costs are dominated by the up
front negotiation costs and that the subsequent recordkeeping and response costs are quite
small.
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
$7,500 current expenditure after the expected thirty-nine year wait for the
organs is approximately $34,650, or about $5,775 per major organ.18 9 The
bottom line: to recoup both these transaction costs and the costs of payments to
organ bearer estates, major organs would have to be sold by organ buyers to
the ultimate transplant recipients or their agents at prices of approximately
$30,000 apiece.190 This figure is in general agreement with Hansmann's
estimate that organ buyers will likely have to pay between $100,000 and $1
million per full set of organs harvested to obtain the necessary degree of
participation in futures contracts by organ bearers. 191
Prices at these levels, unfortunately, would increase the overall costs of
transplant operations between roughly 10% to 100%, depending upon the
organ transplanted. 192 Cost increases of this magnitude perhaps could begin to
affect organ access due to ability-to-pay constraints. The high prices paid to
organ bearer estates under the contingent payment option also could create
uncomfortably strong incentives for organ-preserving forms of suicide. This
latter prospect might counsel restricting organ buyer payment options to
certain, smaller payments upon the organ bearer's death.
189 This is calculated by taking the $7,500 current outlay and compounding it at a 4%
annual rate for the expected 39 year period until the organs are harvested ($7,500 x
(1.04)39 = $34,650).
190 $23,100 + $5,775 = $28,775, or in round numbers, $30,000. As discussed in the
text, this estimate is premised upon offering organ bearers payment options having a present
value of $200 and incurring a $50 transaction cost per organ futures contract. Any change
in these underlying assumptions will have corresponding impacts upon the final organ sale
price estimates obtained.
I have assumed for these preliminary estimates that the prices for major organs will not
vary significantly between different types of organs. Of course, if the pattern of organ
demand does not precisely match the distribution of supply of various organs, then supply
and demand forces probably will lead to different equilibrium prices for different types of
organs. Such a mismatch seems quite likely to occur. The overall organ supply distribution
should reflect human biology, while the pattern of demand will reflect many different social
and medical factors and bear little if any relation to initial biological endowments.
191 Henry Hansmann has speculated that promises to pay organ bearers sums having
annual present values of $10 to $100 may be necessary to induce participation in futures
contracts on a large scale. Hansmann, supra note 1, at 66-67. Under his calculations-
based upon the statistical probability that a typical person has a 1/10,000 chance of dying in
a manner that preserves his organs in any given year-this would require organ buyers to
obtain from transplant recipients approximately $100,000 to $1,000,000 per full set of
organs harvested and sold to recoup their costs. Id. These figures are much closer to the
numbers I suggest in this Article than they are to the Cohen estimates.
192 For the estimated transplant surgery costs, see supra note 2.
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2. Contracts Involving Minors
It is crucial to augment the current limited supply of small-size organs
harvested from the cadavers of minors. To achieve this objective, I have chosen
to propose to allow parents to enter their children into organ futures contracts.
Opponents of commercialization who are willing to allow a futures market to
operate under the payment restrictions I have proposed should have no serious
objections to allowing minors to be entered into such contracts. 193 Conferring
this authority upon parents is consistent with our general conception of the
parent-child relationship in which we allow parents to make decisions for their
children that have far more direct and significant impacts upon their children's
lives than the manner of disposition of their organs after their death. Moreover,
we currently allow the parents of a deceased child to donate the child's
organs; 194 my proposal would simply add the possibility of the parents
arranging for funds to possibly augment that child's estate. 195 Upon reaching
majority, the children would be accorded the rights held by all organ bearers to
rescind the contracts without liability.
3. Cash Sales by Relatives of Organ Bearers
It is a close and difficult question how to handle the situation of a person
who dies with harvestable organs, but who has not indicated an intention to
donate his organs nor has entered into a futures contract. To the extent we wish
to recognize the concept of individual property rights in bodily organs, it may
be appropriate to assume that such a person has chosen not to make his organs
available, and to bury or cremate the organs with him. On the other hand, that
person simply may not have given the questions of organ donation or sale any
serious thought, and it would seem misguided to allow a person who
193 1 concede that under most if not all intestate succession statues the proceeds of the
deceased child's estate would devolve upon the parents. A person could, therefore, possibly
benefit financially while still alive if he has entered his children into organ futures contracts,
whereas he could not do so by entering into such futures contracts with regard to his own
organs. This might be regarded by some as coming uncomfortably close to allowing cash
sales of organs, and could (at least theoretically) create some incentives for parents to
expose their children to greater risk of traumatic brain injury. If this is regarded as a
significant problem, restrictions could be imposed on such contracts for minors comparable
to the limitations that I have suggested be placed upon organ sales by relatives of deceased
persons who have died without entering into futures contracts, i.e., require that the proceeds
paid under such contracts be paid only to religious or other non-profit organizations rather
than to the decedent's estate.
194 See supra text accompanying note 62.
195 See supra note 193.
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desperately needs an organ transplant to die in order to honor an abstract organ
bearer right that has never been meaningfully exercised. Recall that under our
current system we would allow the surviving kin to donate the organs of a
decedent who has made no provision for donation.' 96
A futures market system-with its deferred payment protections against
allowing organ bearers to be pressured into hasty organ sales-cannot deal
effectively with this situation, because the organ bearer is deceased already and
his relatives are likely to benefit directly and promptly from any payments
made to his estate. The compromise solution I propose is to allow the relatives
of a deceased person, who has given no indication of any preferences with
regard to the disposition of his organs, to either donate or sell the organs, thus
giving the relatives an additional incentive to make those organs available for
transplant. The financial incentives created by the sale option would, however,
be muted and "humanized" by limiting relatives to obtaining only the personal
satisfaction and informal recognition associated with making a substantial
contribution to their favorite church or charity. Some opponents of
commercialization still may believe that my proposal here goes too far toward
encouraging survivors to view their deceased relatives as a cash commodity,
and may also lead them to pressure medical personnel to "pull the plug"
prematurely on comatose patients who may be revivable. I am sympathetic to
these concerns, and I call for these critics to propose a better formula that still
is responsive to the need to provide relatives of deceased organ bearers with
sufficient incentives to make the organs available so as to prevent their waste.
4. Cash Sales by Organ Bearers
My proposal flatly prohibits the sale of organs to be removed while the
bearer is still alive. Such sales would directly conflict with the core objections
of the opponents of commercialization. This limitation should not have a
significant adverse impact on organ supply for two obvious reasons. First, it
would only restrict the availability of paired organs, such as kidneys. Second,
if one assumes that the futures market will draw into its pool a substantial
fraction of the available cadavers, there is likely to be a sufficient supply of all
major organs available without resort to live donors, particularly with regard to
paired organ.
I must concede that my proposal raises the spectre of possible "black
market" cash sales of kidneys by living donors or, even more chillingly, the
possibility of murder committed for the purpdse of obtaining bodily organs for
sale on such an illegal market. 197 With organ buyers offering legitimately
196 See supra text accompanying note 62.
197 See Russell Scott's entertaining discussion of two notorious 19th century British
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harvested kidneys and other major organs for transplantation at prices in the
neighborhood of $30,000, persons may be tempted to surreptitiously sell a
single kidney for immediate removal-and immediate cash payment-to
dishonest organ buyer middlemen or desperate persons unable to afford
legitimately acquired organs, or even to commit murder so as to obtain salable
organs.198
The potential for such reprehensible conduct could be virtually eliminated
by taking the obvious prophylactic measures. 199 -First, substantial criminal
penalties should be imposed upon any person found guilty of knowingly buying
or selling an illegally harvested organ. Second, it should be required that all
harvested organs be accompanied by documentation certifying their source that
is prepared by the harvesting physician, and that such documentation be subject
to random audits by appropriate government officials. Third, it should be
required that all organ transplantations should be accompanied by a review of
the documentation of the source of the organ. These standard regulatory
measures probably would be sufficient to prevent any large-scale abuses. There
would, of course, possibly still be rare, isolated instances of abuse-most likely
taking the form of substitution of an illegally procured kidney for a legitimately
harvested one that had lost its viability prior to transplantation, rather than the
more lurid form of murder for dismemberment and sale-but not on a scale
sufficient to undermine the integrity of the futures market restrictions. Such
abuses, one must realize, also occur upon rare occasions under the current
donation-based system, which provides those potential recipients that are at the
end of the long waiting queues for kidney transplants200 with a strong incentive
to offer under-the-table payments to living kidney donors.201
scandals involving multiple murders and subsequent sales of the corpses to medical schools
for anatomical examination purposes. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 8-10.
198 Id.
199 The comparable "body snatcher" abuses that took place in 19th century England to
supply cadavers for medical school purposes effectively were brought to an end by the
standard regulatory measures contained in the Anatomy Act of 1832. Id. at 11-12:
The Anatomy Act of 1832 introduced the principle of licensing .... Strict rules were
imposed upon anatomy schools, including... supervision by government inspectors,
and the filing of regular reports .... The Anatomy Act of 1832 wag a simple and
completely effective piece of legislation that at one stroke destroyed the trade of the
body snatchers.
Id.
200 On average, the waiting time in the U.S. for a kidney is 457 days. Delay Sought in
Combining of Transplant Waiting Lists, DALLAS Mo1,N. NEWS, June 30, 1993, at 23A.
201 Consider the well-publicized incident of a Turkish father who sold a kidney for
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5. Buyer Notification/Organ Preservation Responsibilities
The question of how to allocate notification and organ preservation
responsibilities raises some practical difficulties, but fortunately does not seem
to involve any divisive issues of principle. I have attempted to set forth a
common sense resolution that imposes the cost burden of notification and
preservation initially on the hospital-at that point in time the least-cost avoider
of preventable organ losses-with some of the notification costs (the cost of
maintaining the national futures contract registry) spread across society as a
whole through the governmental fisc. This organ preservation cost burden is
then shifted to the organ buyer once he is notified (and accepts the organ) and
the hospital's information advantage ceases to exist. This allocation of
responsibility would result in a minimum amount of preventable organ loss,
and would encourage hospitals to notify organ buyers quickly. It would,
however burden hospitals with unrecoverable prenotification costs should the
organ buyer decline the organs; this cost should perhaps be spread more
broadly through some governmental funding arrangement. The potential for a
negligence action would motivate hospitals to change their current practice of
obtaining the consent of the decedent's survivors before harvesting organs,
because the hospitals would then be exposed to suit by organ buyers seeking to
enforce their rights.
6. Market Determination of Prices
I strongly favor relying on market forces to determine the prices paid under
futures contracts, primarily because no one currently has any good idea of what
the market-clearing prices for various bodily organs are likely to be. Under
these circumstances, the trial-and-error processes of markets are ideally suited
to economize on limited knowledge and elicit the needed information from
many decentralized sources. Competition among organ buyers is likely to
dissipate any monopsony profits. If the organ futures market proves not to be
as competitive as I expect it to be, there may be justification for some form of
governmental intervention limiting the price negotiation aspects of the organ
futures contracting process. 202
$4,400 in order to pay for an operation for his daughter. Take My Kidney, Please, TomE,
Mar. 13, 1989, at 88.
202 In particular, for some forms of hu man tissue transplantation immuno-suppressant
drugs are not yet effective, and close tissue matching is therefore still of crucial importance.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 49. There could well be instances in which there would be only a
single organ buyer who had matching tissue available to meet the needs of a given recipient,
and that buyer could then engage in price-gouging unrestrained by potential competition.
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My endorsement of market price determination of the prices to be charged
to the ultimate transplant recipients for organs is, I concede, much more
controversial. One can easily think of good reasons to object to allocating, in
effect, life itself on the basis of ability to pay. But there is method to my
meanness. I agree with the position taken by Cohen that a properly functioning
futures market that draws into its pool a substantial fraction of the 20,000 or so
suitable cadavers available annually will provide sufficient organs to fill all
organ transplantation needs and obviate the need for difficult triage choices.203
The requirement here is to let the prices offered potential organ bearers for
their futures commitments rise to levels that provide sufficient incentive for
them to sign up en masse, and this will occur only if the organ buyer
middlemen can resell those organs at prices sufficient for them to recoup their
costs. These costs must be paid by someone, if sufficient organs are to be
obtained without resort to coercion, and the surest mechanism to assure that
this will occur is to pass those costs on to recipients whose demand, in general,
is highly price-inelastic. Let us first make sure that an adequate supply is there,
and then argue about who is going to help impecunious recipients pay for their
needed transplant organs. I expect that between health insurers and government
entitlement programs the major portion of the costs of even $30,000+ organs
generally will be spread broadly across society, as are the costs of transplant
surgeries now, and there is no reason that a futures market cannot be
accompanied by expanded government programs to facilitate further cost
sharing. Moreover, one must never forget the elementary economic fact that
payments made by or on behalf of organ transplant recipients to organ bearer
estates through the intermediation of organ buyer middlemen are transfer
payments, and do not reflect real resource costs. On the other hand, when a
person dies for lack of a suitable organ when such an organ exists but is
wasted, now that is a real cost.
7. Overall Assessment
If one attempts to evaluate my futures market proposal by the standard
economic criteria of Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,2° 4 the results
Some form of price limitation or application of the unconscionability doctrine might well be
appropriate under these circumstances.
203 Cohen, supra note 1, at 6.
204 Under the Pareto standard, a legal rule is said to be efficiency-enhancing (a
"Pareto-improvement") if it operates to benefit at least one person, by his own assessment,
and harms no one, again by their own assessments. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
oFLAw 12 (3d ed. 1986).
Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a legal rule is said to be efficiency-enhancing (a
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are inconclusive.20 5 An organ futures market, despite its great benefits for
many persons, would not be a Pareto-improvement over the current donation-
based system of organ supply. 206 An attempt to ascertain whether my proposal
would be efficiency-enhancing when judged by the more forgiving Kaldor-
Hicks wealth maximization criterion founders (as do so many attempts to utilize
economic principles to provide definitive guidance for resolving social
questions) upon the indeterminacy inherent in the offer/asking problem.207 If
you measure the benefits of the proposal for potential transplant recipients by
determining their asking prices-how much they would have to be paid to
forego the benefits conferred upon them by the proposal-at least a few of them
"Kaldor-Hicks improvement") if the total dollar value of the benefits, as measured by the
willingness-to-pay of the beneficiaries, exceeds the total dollar value of the costs imposed,
as measured by the willingness-to-pay of the persons who must bear those costs. Id. at 11. It
is not required for a measure to be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement that any compensation
payments actually be made by the gainers to the losers. Id.
For further discussion of the nature and shortcomings of these efficiency criteria, see
generally Gregory Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement:
Confronting the Problems of Nonfaisifiability and Norative Bias, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
231 (1991).
205 This is the usual situation when one attempts to apply those economic efficiency
criteria to evaluate policy measures having broad social impacts.
206 There is certain to be at least one organ recipient under a futures market regime
who could have obtained the needed organ under the current donation-based system at a
lower cost, or at least one person who objects to the commercialization of organ
transplantation on principle. One "loser" is all that it takes for a proposal to fail to satisfy
the extremely stringent Pareto-improvement criterion.
207 The offer/asking problem rears its head when one goes beyond the vacuous
"willingness-to-pay" articulation of the standard microeconomic approach to valuation to
ask whether that willingness is to be measured by asking people who would be benefited by
a measure how much they would be willing to pay, if necessary, to have that measure
implemented-their offer price-or should be measured by how much one would have to
pay those beneficiaries to return the benefit once it was received-their asking price. These
measures can diverge substantially, and persons can conceivably assert infinite asking prices
when they regard something they possess as "not for sale" as a matter of principle. There
unfortunately does not appear to be any neutral, objective means available for determining
whether offer prices or asking prices are the appropriate measures of valuation, which
renders much efficiency analysis uncomfortably indeterminate. For a comprehensive
discussion of the offer/asking problem and its implications, see generally Duncan Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981); cf
Richard Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Detenmination of
Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. RnOv. 1169 (1984). For an excellent recent attempt to
grapple with the implications for legal and economic analysis of the offer/asking problem,
see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept:
Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. UNiv. L.Q. 59 (1993).
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will quite reasonably assert infinite asking prices, because they would have
otherwise died, thus yielding infinite aggregate benefits for the proposal.
Similarly, there are quite likely at least a few opponents of commercialization
who regard their positions as matters of principle not subject to compromise,
and who will assert infinite asking prices for their consent to a futures market
system, yielding infinite costs for the proposal. One could attempt to avoid this
problem by using offer prices to measure both the benefits and costs of the
proposal, and thus obtain finite measures which could be more meaningfully
aggregated. This appears to be an entirely arbitrary resolution of the
offer/asking problem, however, and the results so obtained would appear to
have no particular normative significance for decisionmaking.
With the failure of the more "rigorous" evaluative criteria of economics to
provide a meaningful assessment of the proposal, one has no choice but to
engage in a more intuitive, ad hoe, common sense balancing of interests to
reach a judgment. Such an exercise is necessarily highly subjective, and the
conclusions reached are always open to challenge from persons who begin from
different normative and epistemological premises. Nevertheless, one must
decide where one stands, and my personal conclusion is that an organ futures
market would provide results superior to those obtained through the existing
organ supply system virtually regardless of the point of view from which you
make the comparison.
My futures market proposal splits the difference between the positions
taken by proponents and opponents of commercialization in a manner that
should be acceptable to virtually any member of either group who appreciates
the disastrous consequences of the current donation-based system and
recognizes the need for some form of immediate and radical change.
Proponents of commercialization should agree that this proposal achieves their
central objectives: the introduction of financial incentives into the organ supply
system and the use of market mechanisms to determine the form and size of
those incentives. Opponents of commercialization should also agree that this
proposal goes quite far toward protecting the personhood interests they so
strenuously defend. The restrictions on payments to organ bearers before their
death and on sales by living donors and relatives of decedents will prevent
persons from being economically coerced into selling their organs to meet
pressing financial needs, and will prevent relatives of decedents from
desecrating their memories by auctioning off their organs to the highest bidder
for personal gain. Potential transplant recipients, of course, will be the great
winners under this proposal, because they now will be able to promptly obtain
the organs they so desperately need, at least if they are able to pay for them.
No one will get everything he would like from this proposal. Proponents of
commercialization will have to concede that the aggregate sums that will have
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to be paid to organ bearers to induce futures market commitments are likely to
be significantly greater than previously estimated. This will require the
establishment of some effective public or private mechanisms to subsidize the
purchase of the consequently somewhat expensive organs by those potential
transplant recipients who otherwise would be denied access. Advocates of
commercialization generally find such large-scale subsidization distasteful and
inefficient. They will have to develop some subsidization proposals, however,
if they are to convince opponents of commercialization to go along with a
comprehensive futures market proposal along the lines I have set out.
Opponents of commercialization will have to come to terms with the somewhat
unflattering conception of human motivation that underlies moving to a system
based upon financial incentives, and with the idea that parts of the sacred
human body are being sold, albeit for delivery after death. They also will have
to accept the possibility of at least isolated instances of illegal cash sales, and
that even if mechanisms are instituted to help poorer transplant recipients
defray the costs of obtaining organs, ability-to-pay may remain an occasional
factor in organ access.
Even pqtential transplant recipients, the biggest gainers from my proposal,
will bear some additional burdens. On the plus side, this proposal promises to
alleviate or wholly eliminate the organ shortage. This will be a great boon for
mankind. On the other hand, all of these newly available organs will be
expensive. For those potential transplant recipients who would not otherwise be
able to obtain an organ, the price, whatever it may be, is a great bargain. For
those potential recipients who would have been able to obtain the needed
organs under the current donation-based supply system, however, the proposal
provides no benefits and only higher organ costs. Potential recipients do not
know ex ante, however, whether they will be winners or losers under our
current donation-based system. From the point of view of their veil of
ignorance, one would expect that they would overwhelmingly favor a system
that at least assures the physical availability of the needed organs, even with the
accompanying concerns such a system creates for making the necessary
financial arrangements.
VI. COMPARISON OF THE FUTURES MARKET SOLUTION TO OTHER
ALTERNATIVES TO THE ExIsTING ORGAN SUPPLY SYSTEM
There are essentially two alternatives to the existing donation-based organ
supply system other than some variant of the organ futures market: (1) a
"presumed consent" system (perhaps more accurately described as an "opt out"
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or "escheatage" system);208 and (2) a "cash market" system. 209 Each of these
two alternatives, however, has serious shortcomings that makes it far inferior
to an organ futures market as an alternative to the current inadequate system.
Under a "presumed consent" system such as has been adopted by at least
fourteen European countries, 210 a person who dies with harvestable organs,
and who has not given express indications of being unwilling to donate those
organs, is presumed to have consented to their harvestation, and they then
escheat to the state for harvesting and allocation.211 This presumption overrides
any objections to donation asserted by the surviving kin of the decedent. 212
This approach, therefore, attempts to augment organ supply not by the "carrot"
of financial inducements, but instead by simply expropriating the harvestable
organs of any deceased person who has not specifically objected in advance to
such expropriation.
In theory, such a system would greatly increase the supply of harvestable
organs beyond those now obtained through donations, unless a large number of
persons exercised their right to "opt out" of the system. In practice, the results
obtained in those countries that have implemented a presumed consent system
have been _disappointing.2 13 This disappointment has not resulted from
widespread exercise of the "opt out" choice. The problem instead seems to be
that despite having the legal right to harvest the organs of a deceased person
who has not opted out without obtaining the consent of his relatives, hospital
personnel are unwilling to proceed without their consent, and are
understandably reluctant even to broach the subject to grieving survivors. 214
If hospitals did exercise their full legal rights under a presumed consent
208 Cohen, supra note 1, at 15.
209 A potential third "alternative"-a "mandated choice" system under which
individuals would at some point be required to state their preferences regarding the
donation of their organs-I regard as simply a variation on a donation-based system,
and consequently will not discuss it as an alternative to the current system. For an
insightful discussion of mandated choice, see CETA Report 1-93-2, supra note 32, at
2-3, 7.
210 These countries include Austria, the former republic of Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Germany. See Cantaluppi, et al., Legal Aspects of Organ Procurement in Different
Countries, 16 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 102, 103 (1984).
211 For an insightful discussion of the merits of a presumed consent system relative to
those of an organ futures market, see generally Cohen, supra note 1, at 15-21.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 19-20.
214 Cohen, supra note 1, at 19-20; William Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ
Donation: Lessons From the Frend Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.U. I. INT'L L. &
POL. 1013, 1024 (1987).
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system, all bodily organs would become the property of the government upon
the death of their bearer, unless he had previously exercised his right to opt out
of this arrangement. The government then would be free to direct the hospitals
to harvest these organs as needed and provide them to transplant recipients at
low cost. This approach might solve both the organ supply problem and the
recipient affordability problem.215 It might also have certain other economic
advantages over the futures market approach.216 This "solution" to the organ
supply problem, however, is regarded by many as being a moral outrage,217
because it takes insufficient account of the wishes of the organ bearer and
summarily confiscates his organs if he has not objected in advance. It calls
forth "historical analogies to slavery and contemporary ones to
totalitarianism." 218 Such reservations are the probable reason why such
systems have failed to work in the past. A properly designed futures market
system would make those same organs available without what is, in effect, a
governmental taking of property without compensation, and appears to be the
much better alternative almost regardless of one's point of view.
Under a cash market system, organ bearers would be free to contract to
deliver their organs either during or after their deaths for current cash
payments. Such a system would likely greatly increase the supply of available
organs, if prices were permitted to be set at sufficiently high levels, but would
raise starkly all of the concerns expressed by opponents of commercialization
that the futures market proposal is designed to address. It therefore is unlikely
to expand organ supplies any more than would a properly structured futures
market system, and would be far less acceptable to those who disfavor
commercialization.
215 Then again, it might not, because the actual exercise by hospitals of their presumed
consent rights might result in public outrage and lead to opting out on a massive scale. A
recent Gallup Poll has found that 85% of persons oppose escheatage. Nat Semple, Ending
ti Organ Grinc Transplants Could Be Quicker and Fairer, WASH. POST, July 11, 1993, at
C4. A futures market approach would probably be more efficient than a regime of
presumed consent because it would provide a positive incentive for persons to make their
organs available for transplantation. But see infra note 216.
216 If the primary reason people do not now donate their organs is their reluctance to
confront the prospect of their own mortality, then escheatage may be economically superior
to a futures market because it will make those organs available without forcing people to
bear the psychic costs of contemplating their own death. Cohen, supra note 1, at 18. On the
other hand, perhaps people should be encouraged to confront the fact of their own
mortality. See, e.g., CARLos CASTANEDA, JoURNEY TO IxTLAN (1972) (arguing that
enlightened self-realization can be achieved, if at all, only if life is lived with a
consciousness of death).
217 Cohen, supra note 1, at 18; CEJA Report 1-93-2, supra note 32, at 7.
218 Cohen, supra note 1, at 15-16.
[Vol. 55:1
FUTURES MARKET IN BODILY ORGANS
In summary, if one is seriously willing to consider alternatives to the
existing donation-based organ supply system in the U.S., the concept of a
futures market with accompanying restrictions upon cash organ sales by live
donors and by relatives of decedents seems to be the most promising
possibility.
VII. CHANGING THE LAW TO ALLOW AN ORGAN FUTRES MARKET TO
OPERATE
A. The Dismal Prospects for Favorable Judicial Reinterpretation of
NOTA and the UAGA
The existing statutory framework governing organ donations is extremely
hostile to commercial transactions. 219 Even if the judiciary could be convinced
that the arguments in favor of allowing a futures market in bodily organs to
operate are so compelling that the legal restrictions on commercial transactions
should be subjected to severe scrutiny and circumvented if possible, the
applicable statutes leave little or no room for articulating a jurisprudence that
could finesse those restrictions. Even sympathetic judges with a realist bent and
who accept all of the policy arguments in favor of allowing commercialization
will have great difficulty interpreting a clear statutory "no" to mean "yes."
Any efforts to obtain the, consistent body of permissive judicial statutory re-
interpretations that would be necessary to allow a futures market involving
substantial financial commitments to operate are likely to be futile, and the only
alternatives that appear to hold any promise of success are direct constitutional
or political/legislative challenges to NOTA and the UAGA.
Let me set forth my reasoning in more detail. As previously discussed, the
1968 version of the UAGA-still the basis for current state law in most
jurisdictions-does not expressly address the matter of organ sales. This gives
the courts some room to exercise their discretion. Given the underlying policy
of facilitating organ transplantation that was central to the drafting and
widespread adoption of the UAGA, 220 the forceful arguments that can be made
that a futures market could better achieve that objective than does the existing
system,221 and the lack of clear evidence concerning the intent of the adopting
legislatures, 222 it may be possible to convince judges to construe those statutes
that are based upon the 1968 UAGA to not preclude commercial organ
219 See supra text accompanying notes 42-87.
220 The Sale of Body Parts, supra note 1, at 1186.
221 See supra notes 129-208 and accompanying text.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
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transactions. Such a construction could be accompanied by judicial
endorsement of the concept of property rights in body parts-a concept now
supported by a significant body of legal authority223-which in conjunction
would remove at least the state law obstacles to the operation of a futures
market in the significant number of states that have statutory frameworks based
upon the 1968 UAGA and that have not adopted express prohibitions against
commercial organ transactions. 224
Such rulings, however, would not reach the state law restrictions in the
fourteen states that have adopted the 1987 version of the UAGA22 5 with its
express prohibition on organ sales,226 nor the restrictions existing in those
states that have augmented their 1968 UAGA-based statutes with express
prohibitions. 227 More importantly, they would not address the prohibition
imposed by NOTA barring any organ sale transactions that involve the
instrumentality of interstate commerce.
Some commentators have offered arguments that NOTA can be reasonably
reinterpreted to permit at least a futures market in organs to operate, but those
arguments are rather unconvincing. 228 NOTA makes it unlawful to "transfer
any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if
the transfer affects interstate commerce." 229 One commentator has taken the
position that this language leaves it unclear whether NOTA would prohibit the
sale of an organ if the transfer "is classified as a service rather than as a
purchase or sale."230 There is no indication, however, that Congress intended
NOTA to draw any Uniform Commercial Code-type distinctions between
goods and services. Even if the organ that was transplanted was regarded as an
ancillary aspect of the broader "service" of maintaining the life of the recipient,
the sale of that organ as part of the service arrangements would appear to fall
squarely under the broad NOTA prohibition against compensated transfers.
Whether an organ transaction is characterized as a sale of "goods" or
"services" would appear to bear only upon the applicability of product liability
223 See infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
224 Thirty-nine states still have in f6rce statutory frameworks based upon the 1968
version of the UAGA. UNIF. ANATOMICAL G]Fr Acr, 8A U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1993). Of those
states only a few have adopted express prohibitions against organ sales. Bray, supra note 1,
at 209, 223-24, 225 n.103 (citing such statutes for Illinois, New Mexico, New York, and
Virginia).
22 5 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr, 8A U.L.A. 3 (Supp. 1993).
226 Id. at § 10, 8A U.L.A. 29 (Supp. 1993).
227 See supra note 86.
228 See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
-229 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
230 Karen L. Johnson, Note, The Sale of Human Organs: Implicating a Propeny
Right, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 741, 743 n.20 (1987).
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remedies or Uniform Commercial Code-based implied warranties, 231 and not
on the applicability of the sale restrictions themselves.
Another commentator has focused upon the "valuable consideration"
language of the NOTA prohibition,23 2 and has argued that the statute's
definition of this phrase is "uncertain" and "might not prohibit the exchange of
an organ for noncash compensation" such as according the "donor's family
members priority if they need an organ in the future and to make a $10,000
donation to the donor's favorite charity in exchange for the donated organ." 23 3
The term "valuable consideration," however, is one of the broadest in all the
law, and is universally understood to cover noncash compensation, deferred
compensation, and payment of compensation as directed to third parties. The
limitations contained in the NOTA definition of valuable consideration do not
suggest that any of those traditional forms of consideration are to be excluded
from the scope of the prohibition.
There is one not entirely implausible textual argument that can be made
concerning the NOTA "valuable consideration" definition. That definition
expressly excludes from its scope the "reasonable payments" associated with
virtually the entire sequence of operations that might be involved in an organ
transplantation. 23 4 Given the broader recognition now generally accorded
property rights in bodily organs, 23 5 one could contend that payments of current
or deferred compensation to the holders of those rights to induce them to give
them up are reasonable payments. It arguably would be "unreasonable" for
transplant recipients to expect to be able to take possession of other persons'
valuable property without paying compensation. Those payments, if regarded
as "reasonable," are certainly "associated" with the sequence of organ
transplantation procedures. As a counter to the argument that the legislative
history of NOTA evidences congressional intent to prohibit organ sales, 23 6 and
that therefore the "reasonable payments" language should be construed to not
include compensation paid to donors for their organs, one can argue that the
legislative history evidences even more clearly the legislative intent to alleviate
231 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491 (Cal. 1990).
232 The definitional provisions of NOTA define "valuable consideration" to not
include "the reasonable payments associated with the removal, transplantation, implantation,
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of
travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with
the donation of the organ." 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (1988).
233 Note, Regulating the Sale of Hwan Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1024 n.92
(1985).
234 42 U.S.C. § 273e(c)(2) (1984).
235 See infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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the organ shortage, and that all textual ambiguities should be resolved in a
manner that furthers achievement of this primary objective. There is little one
can say, however, in response to the further argument that congressional
inaction since 1984 in this area, despite the growing organ shortage, constitutes
an implicit legislative ratification of the universal interpretation of NOTA as
prohibiting organ sales. Moreover, if one attempts to analogize to the adoption
area, where many state statutes permit reasonable payments to be paid to the
biological mother to cover expenses attendant to child-birth, 237 one searches in
vain for judicial approval of payments for intangibles such as separation anxiety
or relinquishment of parental rights that might be viewed as somewhat
congruent with the sacrifices made by an organ donor.
It thus appears that the governing statutes can not reasonably bear a
favorable reinterpretation that would allow a futures market to operate, and that
a frontal assault upon NOTA and the UAGA will be required. I will first set
forth two constitutional arguments that can be mustered against those statutes,
and then turn to the question of developing an effective political/legislative
strategy to support the constitutional challenge and, if necessary, to press for
appropriate statutory amendments.
B. Constitutional Challenges to NOTA and the UAGA
There are two relatively plausible constitutional critiques that can be made
of NOTA and of any state statutes that similarly prohibit the sale of bodily
organs. One or the other of these critiques may provide a legal rationale
sufficient to allow sympathetic courts that are persuaded of the advantages of a
futures market in bodily organs to invalidate those statutes on constitutional
grounds. One of these challenges is based upon the "right to privacy" line of
constitutional jurisprudence, and the other is based upon recent "Takings
Clause" jurisprudence. Each of these constitutional challenges is set forth and
examined below in relatively summary fashion.
237 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114, (1956); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 432:1-602.6 (1992 Supp.).
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1. The Privacy Right Argwnent2 8
A constitutional critique of NOTA and the UAGA-based state statutes can
be offered along the following general lines: The Supreme Court has long
recognized a fundamental right of privacy under the United States Constitution.
An individual's decision whether to sell his bodily organs is a deeply personal
and private matter that falls within the scope of that privacy right. When
Congress or a state legislature enacts legislation that limits the exercise of a
fundamental right, that legislation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny,
and can be justified only by a compelling state interest. The state interests
implicated here can be adequately protected by requiring organ sales to take
place within a futures market context. There is no compelling state interest
served by imposing more extensive restrictions that prohibit all organ sales.
NOTA and the UAGA-based prohibitions therefore unnecessarily violate
fundamental privacy rights and should be invalidated. Even if NOTA and the
UAGA-based statutes are regarded as being primarily economic legislation-on
the basis that they permit organ donation and prohibit only sales-the decision
to sell an organ inherently involves fundamental personal rights as well as
economic rights, and such personal rights are implicated by such a sweeping
limitation of options. These statutes must therefore meet at least an intermediate
standard of review; the legislation must be precisely tailored to further a
substantial state interest. Because restriction of organ transactions to a-futures
market would serve fully the substantial state interests implicated, the NOTA
and UAGA-based prohibitions are overbroad and constitutionally invalid.
This line of argument has a certain plausibility and merits a more detailed
examination. The Supreme Court clearly has taken the position that there exists
an unenumerated right of privacy that merits constitutional protection. 23 9
Although many of the Supreme Court decisions in this area have focused upon
23 8 The constitutional right of privacy argument against the NOTA sale prohibitions is
well-developed in Johnson, supra note 230, and many of the arguments infra are drawn
from that discussion. Other commentators who have recognized that NOTA may be
vulnerable to a constitutional challenge on right of privacy grounds include Mary Taylor
Danforth, Note, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits,
6 YALE L. & PoL'Y. Rnv. 179, 186-89 (1988); Note, Regulating the Sale of Human
Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1025 (1985).
239 The development of the main features of the right of privacy jurisprudence can be
traced through the following well-known line of Supreme Court cases: Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (establishing the right of privacy in the contraceptive context); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right of privacy in the contraceptive
context); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (establishing the freedom of
association).
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statutes impacting marriage and family life,240 a substantial number of lower
court decisions handed down over the last two decades in the "right to die"
cases have interpreted the privacy right more broadly to cover medical
decisions regarding personal health and the quality of life.241 For example, in
Gray v. Romeo242 the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island ruled
that a patient had a right grounded in the constitutional right of privacy to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.243 Similarly, in Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, Inc.244 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that the right to privacy protected a patient's right to refuse medical
treatment. 245 It held that decisions regarding an individual's quality of life
should be made by the individual rather than the state, and no state interest
could override the patient's right to discontinue treatment.246 As early as 1976,
the New Jersey Supreme Court had held in Matter of Quinlan247 that even a
"compelling" state interest was not sufficient to override the patient's right of
privacy to decline medical treatment. 248 Even the possibility of the patient's
death resulting from her decision was determined not to be an adequate reason
to allow the state to infringe upon her fundamental privacy right to decide upon
240 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (protecting the right to
marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (reviewing a housing
ordinance's definition of "family"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the
right to abortion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (establishing the right to abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting the right to use contraception);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the right to use contraception).
241 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal.
App. 1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
242 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.L 1988).
243 Id. at 584-86. The opinion emphasized -that "the right to control fundamental
medical decisions is an aspect of the right of self-determination and personal autonomy" that
is deeply rooted in our traditions. Id. at 586. The court declared forcefully that "the right to
control medical decisions affecting one's body can hardly be questioned. The root premise
is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that '[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body....'" Id. at 586 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)).
244 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
245 Id at 633.
-246 Id. at 635.
247 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
248 Id at 664.
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her own course of treatment.249
The difficult question is whether this line of right to die privacy cases that
protects an individual's right to make certain, very fundamental medical
decisions can be interpreted to extend protection to the deeply personal but not
life-threatening decision to sell a bodily organ for postmortem transplantation
purposes. A strong case can be made for such an expansive interpretation. The
organ sale decision does involve bodily integrity in a direct, personal way
comparable to the decisions at issue in the right to die cases. The decisions to
sell organs are definitely "medical decisions affecting one's body" of the sort
that the Gray court argued merited constitutional protection.25 0 Even though
some persons may believe that selling organs is an incorrect course of conduct.,
under the rationale of Brophy, the wisdom of a decision regarding health and
the quality of one's life is not relevant to determining its claim to constitutional
protection.25 1 The right of a person to make his own decision in such matters is
arguably particularly appropriate for protection in a situation such as organ
transplantation where there are no simple answers or obvious solutions to the
complex dilemmas posed.25 2
On the -other hand, there exist recent Supreme Court opinions which
suggest that if the Supreme Court were squarely presented with the question it
would rule that the NOTA and UAGA-based prohibitions on organ sales would
not violate the constitutional right of privacy. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dept. of Health25 3 the Supreme Court addressed the right-to-die question and
declined to hold that the decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment is
encompassed by the constitutional right of privacy.25 4 The Cruzan ruling could
be regarded as indicating only a reluctance to extend constitutional privacy
rights in the narrow right-to-die context, or it may be read more broadly as
indicating a general reluctance to extend those protections beyond the contours
defined by precedents.
The latter interpretation unfortunately seems more in accord with the
restrictive position taken by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardick.25 5 The
Supreme Court in Bowers refused to accord privacy right protection for
249 Id.
250 Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988).
251 Johnson, supra note 230, at 754.
252 Id.
253 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
254 Id. at 279 n.7. The opinion did not hold that the right to refuse treatment was
necessarily outside of the zone of the right of privacy, but simply that the issue "was more
properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Id.
255 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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homosexuals against a statute criminalizing sodomy. 25 6 The Court framed the
issue narrowly as relating to the right to engage in homosexual sodomy rather
than more broadly as concerning the right to engage in private, consensual
sexual behavior. 25 7 The opinion stressed that the right of privacy should extend
only to include personal decisions that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," 25 8 or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 259
Under the Bowers approach, the constitutional issue raised by the NOTA
prohibitions would likely be characterized narrowly as the question of the right
to sell body parts in commerce, rather than more broadly as the question of the
right to control the postmortem disposition of one's body. From this
perspective, it does not appear that the right to sell bodily organs is necessarily
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty to the extent that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [that right] were sacrificed." 260 Nor is there any deeply
rooted tradition of organ sales in the United States. To the contrary, the recent
period during which organ transplants have become feasible has been
characterized by the widespread adoption of legislative prohibitions that appear
to have at least implicit public support.
Bowers would thus appear to present a substantial obstacle to the right of
privacy attack on the NOTA prohibitions. Nevertheless, the Gray decision was
rendered post-Bowers (although, concededly, pre-Cruzan), and the Gray court
had little difficulty distinguishing between the homosexual rights at issue in
Bowers and the medical decision rights implicated in the controversy before it.
The Bowers opinion may well come to be regarded generally as an example of
particular antipathy towards homosexuals, and its approach of characterizing
the rights at issue narrowly may not be consistently followed in privacy right
controversies outside of that limited context.
If it can be established that the organ sale decision falls within the zone of
privacy right protection, then attention must turn to whether the blanket NOTA
and UAGA-based prohibitions against such sales can satisfy the requisite
criteria of protecting a compelling state interest, and of being narrowly drawn
so as to limit that right only to the extent necessary to protect that interest. 261
At this point in the argument, one would introduce the concept of a futures
market for bodily organs, and attempt to show that limiting organ sales to such
256 Id. at 191.
257 Id. at 190.
258 Id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
259 Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
260 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
261 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 155 (1973) (holding that regulations affecting
fundamental rights can only be justified by compelling state interests).
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a regime would protect all of the implicated compelling state interests. If this
showing can be made to the satisfaction of the courts, then the blanket NOTA
and UAGA-based prohibitions on organ sales could well be struck down as
overbroad. If the constitutional inquiry comes down to this issue the prospects
for invalidation of at least the UAGA-based statutes are favorable,262 although
historically the courts have been highly reluctant to invalidate an act of
Congress such as NOTA. 263
Defenders of these statutes would doubtless seek to characterize them as
merely economic legislation that does not implicate privacy rights, because they
do not restrict-and even attempt to facilitate the exercise of-an individual's
right to donate his organs for transplantation, and seek only to prevent the
individual from doing so for compensation. Thus, the private, personal, bodily
integrity aspects of the organ donation decision are not being infringed, but
rather only the economic consequences are being affected. It is established law
that when a statute affects purely economic rights, the governmental body need
only show that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose to pass
constitutional muster.264
This is a powerful argument, but a response can be offered. NOTA and the
UAGA-based statutes are surely rationally related to legitimate state purposes,
but are arguably not forms of economic "regulation." While economic
regulations generally attempt to steer commercial activity into socially
acceptable channels, and are intended to curtail excesses and abuses, these
statutes' flat prohibitions on all forms of commercial activity in bodily organs
arguably go beyond merely regulating such activity and limit it in such a drastic
manner that the protected, private, personal decision is so confined as to be
abridged. When legislation has an economic aspect and satisfies rationality
criteria, yet infringes upon fundamental personal rights, arguably at least an
intermediate standard of review should be applied. 265
In Plyler v. Doe2 66 the Supreme Court applied such an intermediate
standard of review in the education context . It balanced the "substantial" state
262 In accord are Danforth, supra note 238 and Johnson, supra note 230.
263 See, e.g., United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
264 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
(1978) (holding that courts should not interfere with economic legislation on constitutional
grounds unless the legislation is arbitrary or irrational); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine
the... propriety of laws that touch economic problems .... "); United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (legislation affecting commercial transactions is not
unconstitutional if it rests upon a rational basis).
265 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
266 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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interest there implicated against the resulting infringement on various individual
rights, and found that the State of Texas had not met its burden.267 In similar
fashion, it could be argued that the governmental interests furthered by
imposition of the NOTA and UAGA-based prohibitions-beyond those
interests adequately furthered by the more measured approach of limiting organ
sales to the confines of a futures market-are not "substantial." Even if the
interests are substantial, they are outweighed by the importance of the privacy
and economic interests abridged. This "intermediate review" argument for
striking down the NOTA and UAGA-based prohibitions is more difficult to
sustain than the privacy right argument made above; that the NOTA and
UAGA-based prohibitions are not properly limited nor necessary to further
compelling state interests given the availability of the futures market
alternative. It does, however, have its adherents. 268
2. The Takings Clause Argunent
A second constitutional critique of NOTA and the UAGA-based sale
prohibitions. can be elaborated along the following general lines: Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments no governmental body may take private
property for public use without paying the owner just compensation. 269 During
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, only actual physical appropriations
of property were found to constitute governmental takings.270 However, since
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon271 the Supreme Court has recognized that
regulatory interference with the rights of property owners that stops short of
actual physical appropriation may, in some instances, constitute a taking
requiring compensation. 272 In its recent landmark decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Counci 273 the Supreme Court forcefully reasserted the
concept of a regulatory taking. Under the standards articulated in Lucas, any
law that proscribes all economically beneficial use of private property
constitutes a taking that requires compensation unless the proscribed uses were
not inherent in the owner's title-such as! when the proscribed uses 'were
classified as actionable nuisances at common law.274
267 Id. at 230.
268 See generally Johnson, supra note 230.
269 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2 70 Paul F. Haffner, Note, Regulatory Takings-A New Categorical Rule, 61 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1035, 1038 (1993).
271 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
-
272 Id. at 416.
273 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
274 Id.
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Under modem law, a person's bodily organs have become widely
recognized as constituting a form of personal property to which many of the
usual incidents of property ownership attach. 275 Both NOTA and the UAGA
attempt to further certain public interests by facilitating voluntary donation of
organs and by prohibiting persons from making any economically beneficial
use of the right to control the disposition of their bodily organs after their
death. There was, however, no doctrine at common law that limited a person's
right to dispose of his organs for compensation on the basis that such
compensated transactions constituted a public nuisance. Therefore, under the
Mahon-Lucas line of cases, NOTA and the UAGA constitute takings of the
rights of organ donors to make economically beneficial use of their property,
without compensation, and thus should be held constitutionally invalid.
The Mahon-Lucas line of reasoning hinges upon three central issues: (1)
whether persons have a property right in their bodily organs which, in the
absence of statutory abridgment, includes the right to sell those organs; (2)
whether the expansive Lucas precedent is restricted to takings of real property,
or is more broadly applicable to protect property interests in bodily organs; and
(3) whether,. assuming that Lucas applies to property interests in bodily organs,
the NOTA and UAGA-based restrictions deprive persons of "all economically
beneficial use" of their bodily organs so as to trigger the Lucas compensation
requirement.
There is substantial authority supporting the proposition that a person's
bodily organs are widely regarded as tangible, personal property over which
the owner may exercise many of the usual rights incident to property
ownership. While traditional English common law did not recognize property
rights in human bodies, modem American courts have generally deviated from
this position. Many states recognize at least a limited property right with regard
to cadavers. 276 Numerous other courts have in recent years taken further steps
towards recognizing a broader property right in bodily tissues. 277 A recent
275 See infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
276 See, e.g., Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 127 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1976) (holding that a
daughter had the legal right to direct the disposition of her father's corpse); Leno v. St.
Joseph Hosp., 302 N.E.2d 58 (Il1 1973) (stating that a decedent's next of kin has a right of
possession of the body for purposes of arranging disposition); Finley v. Atwell Transport
Co., 115 N.E. 715 (N.Y. 1917) (concluding that the son had a cause of action against a
steamship company for not returning his father's body to the U.S. for burial); In re Moyer,
577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) (stating that a person has a "property right of a special
nature" in controlling and directing the "disposition of his body [parts] after death").
277 See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[B]lood
plasma... like any salable part of the human body, is tangible property ... ."); Venner v.
Maryland, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (Md. App. 1976) stating that:
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significant decision went beyond all earlier holdings to flatly declare that
human tissue is the property of the person from whom it is removed. 278 In
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,2 79 a case involving the
property rights of a hospital patient in his removed spleen and in the
commercial prospects for pharmaceutical products developed from cells
contained in that spleen, the California Court of Appeals stated forcefully:
We have been cited to no legal authority... which compel[s] a
conclusion that the plaintiff cannot have a sufficient legal interest in his
own bodily tissues amounting to personal property.... To our
knowledge, no public policy has ever been articulated, nor is there any
statutory authority, against a property interest in one's own body.... The
rights of dominion over one's own body, and the interests one has therein,
are recognized in many cases. These rights and interests are so akin to
property interests that it would be a subterfuge to call them anything
else .... The essence of a property interest-the ultimate right of
control-therefore exists with regard to one's own human body. Even
though the rights and interests one has over one's own body may be
subject to important limitations because of public health concerns, the
absence of unlimited or unrestricted dominion and control does not negate
the existence of a property right for the purposes of a conversion
action.... A patient must have the ultimate power to control what
becomes of his or her tissues. 280
The opinion in Moore was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the
California Supreme Court.281 That court reversed the lower court's ruling that
the plaintiff could sustain a cause of action for the conversion of his spleen, but
It could not be said that a person has no property right in... materials which were
once a part of or contained within his body.. ;. It is not unknown for a person to
assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion, or control, for good reason or for no
reason, over such things as... organs or other parts of the body.
Id.; see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Cal. App. 1986) ("Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body ... ."); O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899) (stating that there
exist "property rights in the body which will be protected, and for a violation of which" the
next of kin will be entitled to indemnification).
278 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. App. 1988).
.279 Id.
280 Id. at 503-08.
281 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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held that his complaint did state a cause of action for breach of the physician's
duty to disclose.282 The court, however, failed to take a clear position on the
question of property interests in bodily organs: "[W]e do not purport to hold
that excised cells can never be property .... ,283
NOTA and the state codifications of the UAGA themselves-with their
elaborate procedures for facilitating the donation of organs by donors or their
surviving kin, and their exemptions to allow the commercial sale of hair,
sperm, blood, and other regenerative tissues-also serve to demonstrate that the
prevailing legal landscape now recognizes property rights in bodily organs.
Given this authority, it is at least arguable that the bundle of rights which
constitute the bodily organ property interest would, absent the NOTA and
UAGA-based sale prohibitions, be the bundle normally incident to personal
property ownership, and would include the right of a person who bears those
organs in his body to sell them to potential transplant recipients or their agents
for delivery after his death.284 The NOTA and UAGA-based prohibitions,
therefore, can be regarded as limiting these background common law rights,
and conceivably could constitute takings without compensation under a
Lucas285 analysis.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas is potentially very sweeping in its
scope and merits close examination. That case involved a challenge by an
owner of two parcels of property to a South Carolina statute enacted after the
owner had acquired title that barred the owner on environmental grounds from
erecting any permanent habitable structures on the parcels.28 6 That statute so
restricted the owner's ability to utilize the parcels that his interest had become
"valueless." 28 7 The owner conceded that the statute was a lawful exercise of
the state's police power, but contended that the complete destruction of the
property's commercial value nevertheless entitled him to compensation. 288 The
owner was awarded compensation by the state trial court, but the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, citing as authority for its ruling a line of
U.S. Supreme Court cases stemming from the Mugler v. Kansas289 decision
282 Id. at 480.
283 Id. at 493.
284 Id.
285 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
286 Id. at 2890.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The primary cases that have elaborated upon the principles
first set forth in Mugler are Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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that suggested that regulations designed "to prevent serious public harm" could
not constitute takings even if they severely impacted property values. 290 The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, ruled in favor of the property owner, and
reversed the ruling of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded for
further proceedings. 291
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Lucas, and began his analysis
of the merits of the dispute by citing with approval the proposition first set
forth by the Supreme Court in 1922 in Mahon that "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." 292 While recognizing that the questions of when regulations go far
enough to constitute takings generally involve "ad hoc, factual inquiries," he
stated that "where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of land" the effect is categorically compensable "without case-specific
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint." 293 Noting
the caution expressed in Mahon that "[glovernment hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change," 294 Justice Scalia declared that this basis for allowing
value-reducing regulatory restrictions without compensation "does not apply to
the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of
all economically beneficial uses." 295 He concluded that "there are good reasons
for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered
a taking. "
2 96
The Lucas opinion does recognize some limitations upon this sweeping
principle of requiring compensation for all total takings. According to Justice
Scalia, a governmental body need not compensate a person for the deprivation
of all economically beneficial use of land if "the proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with."2 97 Such limitations on the property rights
that an owner may exercise may "inhere in the title itself,"298 or may exist "in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
290 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
291 Id. at 2902.
292 Id. at 2893 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15
(1922)).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 2894 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
295 Id.
296 Id. at 2895 (footnote omitted).
297 Id. at 2899 (footnote omitted).
298 Id. at 2900.
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nuisance already place" upon property ownerhip. 299
A crucial question is whether the Lucas compensation requirements apply
only to total takings of real estate, or apply more generally to protect interests
in personal property as well. This question appears to be the weakest link in the
takings clause argument against NOTA and the UAGA-based statutes. There is
little if any question that personal property as well as real property is entitled to
Fifth Amendment protection. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause refers
generally to "private property" without limitation.3°° The Supreme Court
never has held that the Fifth Amendment protections against uncompensated
governmental appropriation are limited to real property, and has resolved
numerous controversies under the Takings Clause that related to regulations
restricting rights relating to personal property (although, concededly, usually
upholding the governmental regulation).301
While there can, therefore, be takings of personal property which implicate
constitutional protections, it is not clear that the particular Lucas
"compensation for total takings" requirements are applicable to takings of
personal property. The Lucas decision involved a taking of interests in real
property,30 2. and the standards articulated by Justice Scalia in that opinion
consistently refer to real property interests.3°3 Most significantly, while he did
not expressly limit the authority of Lucas to controversies involving the
regulation of real property, Justice Scalia did state that "by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings [a person] ought
to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless." 3°4 His meaning is not entirely clear. This
statement might be read as only requiring for a Lucas analysis a more searching
inquiry into the nature and scope of the bundle of rights persons reasonably
expect to obtain when they acquire property, if the property is personal rather
than real. Alternatively, Justice Scalia's caveat can be interpreted more broadly
as excluding personal property takings altogether from the scope of Lucas, and
leaving unchanged the restrictive jurisprudence in that area. 305
Finally, if persons are regarded as having a common law property right to
299 Id.
30 0 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
301 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (property at issue was Indian
artifacts composed of bird feathers); Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924)
(property at issue was stocks of alcohol); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Cafey, 251 U.S. 264
(1920) (property at issue was stocks of alcohol).3 02 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 2889.
305 See, e.g., the cases cited supra in note 301.
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sell their organs, and if the Lucas opinion is regarded as applicable generally to
all total takings, there is presented the question whether a prohibition on organ
sales constitutes the deprivation of "all economically beneficial use" of those
organs. Such a prohibition of course allows persons to utilize their organs for
their natural purposes as they go through life, including their economic life. It
does, however, completely remove the possibility of a person also benefiting
himself economically in an additional manner by committing himself to a
compensated postmortem transfer of those organs to transplant recipients. If a
person's right to control the postmortem use of his organs by other persons is
regarded as a property interest qualitatively different from and separate from
his interest in using his organs during his life, then the NOTA and UAGA-
based state prohibitions constitute total takings of the economic value of that
separate interest, and the compensation requirements of Lucas would be
implicated. If, however, the use of one's organs during life and the right to
control their postmortem disposition are viewed as two aspects of a single,
indivisible bodily organ interest, the NOTA and the UAGA-based prohibitions
would constitute only partial takings of the value of that- interest, and Lucas
would be inapplicable. The sensitivity of the Lucas analysis to the precise
definition of the property interest at issue is perhaps one of the most serious
difficulties that the courts will encounter in attempting to give force to that
opinion, as Justice Scalia conceded306 and at least one commentator has pointed
out.307
3. Summaty
I have not attempted to exhaustively analyze the merits of the two
constitutional challenges to NOTA and the UAGA-based statutes that I have
presented above. One could certainly sieve those arguments through a much
finer mesh of Supreme Court precedents and constitutional theory. What I have
attempted to demonstrate, however, is that proponents of an organ futures
market have available at least a couple of jlausible constitutional critiques of
the NOTA and UAGA-based organ sale prohibitions. I approach these
constitutional questions from a legal realist perspective. If the judiciary can be
convinced by the policy arguments I have offered in this Article-that social
welfare would be greatly advanced by allowing a futures market in bodily
organs to operate-it likely will be responsive to somewhat novel legal
arguments designed to further that end. One of my constitutional critiques may
then, in more developed form, provide the courts with what they regard as a
3 06 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
307 Paul F. Haffner, Note, Regulatory Takings-A New Categorical Rule, 61 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1035, 1056-57 (1993).
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sufficient legal basis for removing the current statutory obstacles to the
development of such a market. Such judicial action, however, will not suffice
to establish and maintain an organ futures market if Congress or the state
legislatures subsequently act to place additional obstacles in the way of organ
sales to replace the fallen NOTA and UAGA-based prohibitions. The efforts to
overturn those prohibitions on constitutional grounds, even if successful, must
therefore be accompanied by political activity that is influential enough to block
legislative efforts to reimpose those restrictions in a different form. If the
constitutional challenges are unsuccessful, then the political effort will have to
be substantially greater so that the legislative inertia can be overcome and the
NOTA and state UAGA codifications amended in appropriate fashion. I now
turn to developing the contours of a political/legislative strategy that could
achieve these objectives.
C. Creating a Politically Effective Coalition to Amend NOTA and the
UAGA
It would be a great step forward if NOTA and the state UAGA
codifications were amended to allow an organ futures market-to operate along
the lines I have proposed. Just because an organ futures market is a good idea,
however, does not mean it will come to pass. For such a major change to be
made in the legal and institutional framework, it will be necessary to mount a
political effort strong enough to overcome both legislative inertia and the
opposition of certain interest groups in both Congress and the statehouses.
The Schwindt & Vining,308 Hansmann, 30 9 and Cohen310 futures market
proposals were all major steps in the right direction, and laid the intellectual
groundwork for more comprehensive and detailed proposals such as set forth
herein. None of these earlier proposals, however, were followed by any
significant efforts to adopt implementing legislation at the state or federal
levels, and consequently no change has resulted. Our legislative system-with
its deliberately cumbersome framework of committees and subcommittees,
bicameralism, and the like-is designed to be heavily biased in favor of the
status quo, and to kill bills quietly and anonymously unless the forces for
change are extremely powerful and persistent.311 To prod legislatures to act
308 Schwindt & V'ning, supra note 1.
309 Hansmann, supra note 1.
310 Cohen, supra note 1.
311 See, e.g., the insightful discussions by West Virginia Supreme Court Justice
Richard Neely of the causes and consequences of the high degree of legislative inertia that
characterizes the American political system. RICHARD NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN
AMERICA 47-48 (1981); RICHARD NEELY, WHY COURTS DON'T WORK 60-89 (1983).
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favorably in this area it will be necessary for proponents of an organ futures
market to hire full-time paid lobbyists, supported by qualified staff, to exert
efforts on both the state and federal levels. These lobbyists will have to be able
to present target legislators with comprehensive draft legislation sufficient to
achieve the needed changes, 312 along with those accompanying provisions
necessary to provide for the financing of any proposed government
expenditures or tax benefits. They also must be able to supply legislators with
arguments and supporting materials to counter the claims that will be made by
opponents of the legislation and, most importantly, with significant campaign
contributions for legislators to finance any additional reelection efforts needed
to offset any loss of support from opponents of the legislation and the voters
that those opponents may influence.313
Proponents of futures market-enabling legislation can expect to encounter
resistance from two sources. First, there are certain organized and politically
powerful groups who may perceive their interests to be threatened by such
legislation precisely because it promises to sharply increase the supply of
transplantable organs, while simultaneously increasing -the cost of organ
transplantations. I am thinking here specifically of the three major professional
associations of transplant surgeons, all of which have takenstrong positions
threatening to expel any member physician who pays compensation for an
organ. 314 These associations can be expected to oppose any move towards
commercialization, although a well-tailored futures market proposal. would
appear to address their legitimate reservations that are grounded in public
health concerns.315 I am thinking also of the major health insurers, that may
oppose such legislation because of the (probably justified) perception that such
legislation would lead to their having to pay for a larger number of transplant
operations, and at increased per-operation costs to cover the costs of organ
purchases, with a time lag occurring before they are able to adjust their
coverage terms and premiums to reflect their changed claims experience. The
proposal also may be opposed by those federal agencies that currently finance a
significant share of organ transplantation costs and fear the budgetary
consequences of a larger number of more expensive operations. Finally, it may
be opposed by organizations of organ procurement agencies and other
professionals involved in the existing organ procurement and transplantation
system, whose members have become comfortable with accustomed routines
3 12 pIC1ARD NEELY, WHy COURTS DON'T WORK 249-50 (1983).
313 "[M]ost incumbent legislators devote a disproportionate amount of their time,
effort, and political credit to satisfying those people who routinely make political
contributions... ." Id. at 74.3 14 See supra text accompanying note 115.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
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and procedures. 316
A second source of political resistance to such legislation, more diffuse and
intangible but nevertheless present and powerful, is current public opinion. The
public appears to largely accept rather uncritically the arguments offered by
opponents of commercialization that organ sales are morally wrong and
somehow show disrespect for concepts of personhood and individual
dignity.317 As long as politicians believe that a substantial portion of the public
regards organ sales as a moral outrage, it will be nearly impossible to convince
politicians to take visible stances in favor of allowing commercialization, even
if restricted to a futures market regime. This public opinion only can be
changed by a major national education campaign that succeeds in getting across
three key ideas: (1) thousands of people are allowed to die of organ failure
annually while we fail to come anywhere close to fully utilizing the available
supply of cadaver organs; (2) the primary reason that this occurs is because we
have taken away the financial incentive to be an organ donor; and (3) there is
nothing morally problematic about organ sales if they are confined to the
framework of a futures market system such as I have proposed.
This last concept is absolutely crucial to communicate. People must come
to understand that the revulsion they legitimately feel at the thought of persons
selling themselves or their children into slavery, or at the thought of an
impoverished member of the urban underclass or a Third-World peasant selling
for a mere pittance a kidney that will be immediately removed and airlifted to a
Miami Beach transplant center, should not be allowed to affect their judgment
as to the merits of organ futures market proposals that will allow neither of
these forms of abuse to occur. There are rights here implicated, to be sure.
They are, however, the rights of persons to have their mortal remains disposed
of as they see fit, and the rights of many thousands of persons who need organ
transplants to live to offer sufficient financial inducements to have those organs
made available, not any abstract rights of "personhood" which it is claimed
would be somehow infringed upon-in a way never made quite clear3 18-by
316 For example, the resistance exhibited by local organ procurement agencies to
proposed United Network for Organ Sharing rules that would force consolidation of
separate organ waiting lists, Deky Sought in Combining of Transplant Waiting Liss,
DALLAS MoRN. NmWS, June 30, 1993, at 23A, suggests that those agencies also would
oppose a futures market proposal that would effectively allocate organs on a national basis
and eliminate the privileged access certain agencies and hospitals now possess. See also
supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
317 For example, public outrage caused severe embarrassment and political harm for
Milwaukee City Board Supervisor Anthony Zielinski when he proposed that the City of
Milwaukee sell the organs of dead welfare recipients in an effort to reduce the City's burial
expenses. Plan to Sell Organs of Welfare Dead Fails, Cm. TRm., July 22, 1990, § 1, at 17.
318 "It is difficult, however, to find a clear statement of precisely what is meant by
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allowing normal market processes to occur.
How can a political coalition with the clout to overcome these formidable
resistances be created? Who will lend their financial and other resources to the
cause? There is a real collective action problem here that stands in the way of
effective organization of those who would benefit from an organ futures
market.3 19 The primary beneficiaries would be the following groups of
persons: (1) those persons who through that market would be able to obtain a
needed transplant organ, and who would not have been able to do so under the
current system given the severe shortages that exist; (2) those persons who will
be able to obtain funds for their estates through entering into organ futures
contracts, and their heirs, and who would not be able to do so under the
current system; (3) those medical professionals currently involved to a limited
extent in the organ transplant system, and those who would be involved were
there more transplants taking place, who would have expanded professional
opportunities to utilize their skills; and (4) those persons who would benefit
indirectly from or by empathizing with the good fortune of persons in any or
all of the above three groups. Unfortunately, none of the above groups
currently exist in any meaningful, self-conscious, organized form, because it
will not be possible to identify their members until after the organ futures
market is in operation. It is consequently going to be extremely difficult before
that market exists to frame focused appeals that can be expected to elicit
significant donations of financial or other support.
One basis for some optimism is the recent dramatic change in the stance
taken by the American Medical Association (AMA) on this question. As
previously discussed, the AMA House of Delegates has recently adopted as its
official position the remarkably strong endorsement of the futures market
concept recommended by its Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. 320 The
AMA no longer regards organ futures contracts as violative of its ethical
guidelines,321 recognizes that "[A] carefully designed and regulated system of
commodification or why it is undesirable." Hansmann, supra note 1, at 74 (footnote
omitted).
319 See generally MANcUR OLsoN, TRE LOGIC OF COLLECmVE AcTioN (1971), for a
comprehensive discussion of the problems faced in attempting to organize a large group of
persons, each having only a limited interest at stake, into an effective political force.
320 CEJA Report 1-93-6, supra note 16.
321 Id. at 2, where the Report states:
The Council would not view such a system as a violation of Opinion 2.15:
Organ Donation, which states in part that "it is not ethical to participate in a
-procedure to enable a donor to receive payment, other than for the reimbursement
of expenses necessarily incurred in connection with removal, for any of the
donor's non-renewable organs."
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future contracts in cadaver organs could significantly increase the supply of
organs and, for some organs, save many lives, while avoiding the ethical
pitfalls of other forms of incentives,"32 2 and is on record in favor of the
implementation of a pilot futures market program.323 The AMA is a powerful
political organization that obviously will play a pivotal role in the ongoing
national debate concerning the future of our health care system. Not only does
the AMA endorsement provide instant credibility for the futures market
approach, but that organization may with some prodding bestir itself to provide
effective lobbying support for the needed legal changes, as well as serve as the
near-perfect vehicle for futures market proponents to neutralize and discredit
any opposition mounted by the transplant surgeons' associations on the basis of
their more parochial concerns.
Where else can support for a futures market be found? There is the obvious
potential for the creation of a politically effective organization of persons who
have received organ transplants, and their families. The number of such
persons is admittedly not very large, and many of those persons are aged, in
poor health, or have limited financial resources. Nevertheless, there are without
doubt hundreds or even thousands of transplant recipients who are still young
and vigorous, and who feel some civic responsibility to -actively support
measures that would enhance the availability of organs for others still in need.
These persons could engage in debate on the issues in public forums with a rare
degree of credibility and capacity to elicit public empathy, and may well be
able to markedly affect public opinion and favorably influence the environment
in which legislative actions are taken.
Other than the above two groups, I am not sure where else futures market
advocates could profitably turn for additional effective political support. Those
people who are relatives of persons who died because they were unable to
obtain needed organ transplants in timely fashion probably want nothing less
than to revisit their tragedy. Most public interest organizations have insufficient
funding to pursue even their core priorities, and would not be willing to take
on a new controversial cause. The Clinton Administration is not likely to be of
any substantial assistance, given that Vice President Albert Gore was one of the
leading opponents of commercialization during the NOTA congressional
debates.324 None of these other avenues appears promising in terms of
obtaining effective political support, and, therefore, despite the heartening
Id.
322 Id. at 8.
323 Id. at 8-9.
324 See, e.g., National Organ Transplantation Act, 1983: Hearings on H.R. 4080
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 109 (1983) (statement of Sen. Albert Gore, Tenn.).
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AMA endorsement and the prospects for favorable media coverage of
transplant recipient appeals, the cause seems unlikely to attract the political
entrepreneurs and lobbyist support necessary to move it to the forefront of
public debate. It appears to me, therefore, that the prospects may hinge upon
the fate of the constitutional challenges to NOTA and the UAGA-based
statutes. If the organ sale restrictions imposed by those statutes are struck down
on constitutional grounds, then the new legal status quo would arguably allow
commercialization, and the opponents of organ sales would then have to
overcome the considerable inertial resistance to the passage of legislation to
impose new restrictions. Proponents of a futures market would then have the
upper hand, and given solid AMA backing, might be able to force a legislative
compromise under which they could agree to accept restrictions on cash sales
and sales by living donors, in exchange for acquiescence to the futures market
concept. Under these circumstances, I believe that there would be some hope
that an organ futures market could come into existence. If, however, the
constitutional challenges fail, and proponents of a futures market must fight the
steeply uphill battle to obtain major legislative changes, I must frankly admit to
pessimism with regard to the prospects for establishing such a market any time
within the foreseeable future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Every year we allow thousands of people to die who could be saved by the
transplantation of a bodily organ from a cadaver that has no further use for it.
We blame these deaths on the "organ shortage" which we often treat as an
immutable fact of nature. This shortage, however, is totally the creation of a
flawed legal regime that has removed all financial incentives to serve as an
organ donor. A properly designed organ futures market would restore those
incentives, dramatically expanding organ supplies and saving many lives,
without resulting in any of the abusive or degrading practices feared by
opponents of commercialization.
The existing framework of state and federal statutes governing organ
transplantation currently stands as a complete roadblock to the creation of an
organ futures market. Those statutes' organ sale restrictions must be struck
down or amended. While there are some potential sources of support for a
political effort to amend those statutes, most importantly the American Medical
Association and former transplant recipients, such an effort is unlikely to
succeed given the organized opposition and unfavorable public opinion. The
most promising course of action for proponents of an organ futures market
appears to be to seek to have the statutory restrictions on organ sales
invalidated on federal constitutional grounds-thus opening the doors for
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commercial activity in bodily organs-and then from that relatively
advantageous position seeking to muster sufficient political support to meet
those forces seeking to reimpose restrictions halfway with futures market-
oriented compromise solutions.

